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

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by Winston Bradley Davis

ERRATA

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Page and Line	Errata	Correction
11, 1	concensus	consensus
12, 1	Poincare	Poincaré
22, 1	Thier	Their
60, 18	gemeinshäftlich	gemeinshaftlich
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65, 9	"	"
72, 13	vis-a-vis	vis-à-vis
Footnote		
11	pp. 54-59	pp. 68-74
43	pp. 19-20	pp. 26-27
76	See below, p. 68 ff	See below, pp. 88-91
103	Kōdnsha	Kōdansha
106	Shūkyōgaku nenpō	Shūkyōgaku nenpō
112	Asahi Jānaru	Asahi Jānaru
113 (line 30)	See p. 8	See p. 13
119 (line 3)	(page 8 above)	(page 13 above)
125	p. 60	p. 78
127	p. 8	p. 13

TOWARD MODERNITY: A DEVELOPMENTAL TYPOLOGY OF POPULAR RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS IN JAPAN

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TOWARD MODERNITY: A DEVELOPMENTAL TYPOLOGY OF POPULAR RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS IN JAPAN

I. Introduction

A. Synopsis of the typology developed in this study

The purpose of this monograph is to establish a developmental (some would say evolutionary) typology of popular religious affiliations in Japan. Intended for use by historians and sociologists of Japanese religions, the study relies upon the methods and insights of both disciplines. The scope of this paper is deliberately broad. This is not because I claim mastery of the entire range of Japanese religious history--today nobody can--but because typologies and overviews are, by their nature, ambitious and inclusive. Whatever merits this essay may have will lie in the perspective it provides and not in any exhaustiveness of detail. Entire books can, and have, been written--at least in Japanese--on nearly every facet touched upon. What I have done is join and elaborate various hints dropped by Japanese historians and sociologists regarding the development of religious institutions in their country with a conceptual framework derived primarily from the Western social sciences. This framework will be used, hopefully, not to mold history into any a priori schema, but to bring the development of religious affiliations in Japan into a comparative setting.

As far ranging as this paper is, it also has its limits.

I shall be concerned largely with the religious affiliations of the so-called common man. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, this will enable us to focus on the religious activities of the vast majority of the population--and typologies should aim at statistical relevance. In the second place, the popular or folk stratum deserves priority because of the pervasive influence of the Little Tradition in the religious life of the country. One is even tempted to say that in Japan the Little Tradition is is the Great Tradition. Our attention will therefore be centered for the most part on religious associations at the grass-roots level and not upon their definition, regulation or beautification by governmental or sectarian authorities. I shall not be concerned with the organization of the monasteries or the clergy, important as these topics are. I shall not deal in any detail with the various religious schemes created and implanted "from above" such as the kokubunji of the Nara period or the ankokuji of Muromachi. It is my opinion that only after the development of modern communications media did these ideological concoctions become of direct and vital significance for the common man. Because I shall approach my subject from the vantage point of popular religion, the events and ideas of Japanese religious history which usually receive the greatest emphasis may appear slighted. Other things such as economic and demographic change which tend to be overlooked by historians of religion will take on greater importance.

Because the historical and sociological descriptions essayed in this study are necessarily complex, I should like to state at once, and as simply as possible, the crux of the matter. In the following pages I shall describe 1) how lower classes of peasants become dissociated from traditional, patron-client type relationships both socially and religiously, 2) how they gradually undermined the monopolistic affiliations which had been used to exclude and control them, 3) how more inclusive religious institutions and symbols helped to reintegrate Japanese society on a broader, territorial basis, and 4) how in the Modern Period, Japanese religion encouraged the activities of individuals and helped generate a new national identity.

While history abhors stages, I can best tell this story by dividing it into three main sections.[1] Because these periods of religious history do not always correspond to the conventional divisions of Japanese history, I shall use capital letters whenever I refer to this typological periodization.

I. The Ancient and Early Medieval Period (c. 600 to c. 1400 A.D.)

The rise of socio-religious monopolies; the establishment of syncretistic affiliations between local and adventitious deities; Buddhism trickles down to the common people illegally in the Ancient Period; it is spread widely among them during the Early Medieval Period.

II. The Late Medieval Period (c. 1400 to c. 1868 A.D.)

The rise of territorial Shinto parishes; the development of family temples and representational confraternities; the Buddhism which was preached and propagated to the common people in previous centuries becomes institutionalized.

III. The Modern Period (c. 1868 to the present)

The nation itself emerges as the holy community par excellence; the individual religious affiliations of "clients" and "devotees" rapidly expand.

Closely related to these three stages are four dominant ideologies, i.e. networks of ideas, symbols and values providing motivation and sustenance for individual and social action and identity:

I. The Ancient and Early Medieval Period

An ideology of lineage.

II. The Late Medieval Period

The lineage ideology in a modified form becomes absorbed by smaller and more or less autonomous families; communities are reorganized along the lines of a territorial ideology; an ideology based on single meditational or devotional practices begins to take root as a result of the New Buddhism of the Kamakura period.

III. The lineage ideology of ancient Japan is artificially revived by the state; an ideology of faith and commitment is developed by the so-called New Religions as the modern equivalent (in many ways) of the single practice ideologies of the Late Medieval Period.

Caveat lector: The stubborn facts of history have a way of confounding typological schemes. Because each area of Japan underwent change at different times, it is hazardous to suggest, though I think we must, that changing religious affiliations can be dated at all. In nearly all cases, change was spearheaded in the areas of most rapid economic development. In Ancient Japan, such changes were first felt in the parts of the country most exposed to the influence of the mainland. It was here that Buddhism was first introduced and patronized. In the

Late Medieval Period changes in religious affiliation took place first in those parts of the country where a money economy was spreading most rapidly. In Modern Japan, religious changes have taken place in the cities throughout the country, spreading finally to all but the most remote island and mountain villages. As long as these discrepancies in time and space are borne in mind we can safely argue that the stages outlined above represent the general development of religious affiliations and ideologies in Japan. This typology therefore does not imply any unilinear evolution from monopolistic groups to territorial ones, or ones based on "faith alone." Furthermore, I do not wish to say that the clients and devotees of the Modern Period will have the last word in the annals of Japanese religious history. I merely hope to show that while families and individuals of all periods of Japanese history have participated in a variety of religious affiliations, those indicated by these three stages were of the greatest significance, if not always quantitatively, at least as symptoms of overall social and economic change.[2]

B. A Method for Studying Religious Affiliations and Social Change

Since the publication of Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges' La Cité Antique in 1864, the importance of religious affiliations as indices of social, economic and political change in all civilizations has become increasingly evident. In this now dated but still impressive masterpiece de Coulanges traces

the development of Graeco-Roman civilization through a series of stages: the gens, curia, tribe, city and finally, the Roman Empire itself. Each stage corresponds to specific religious conceptions, institutions and affiliations ranging from the hearth-gods of the ancient gens to the universal deities of the Empire. Behind this religious evolution de Coulanges discerned various social and political revolutions, from the revolt of the aristocrats against the ancient kings to the establishment of an aristocracy of wealth and achievement. In late antiquity these changes resulted in the secularization of politics and nature as well as the growth of scepticism and individualism. While religious and social identities had been completely merged in the archaic period, de Coulanges shows that, thanks to these upheavals, ancient society experienced 1) the growth of more inclusive, or enfranchised communities, e.g. the emergence of a territorial society out of the archaic gens, and 2) the increase of what nowadays would be called socio-cultural differentiation culminating in the spread of Christianity which, as de Coulanges puts it, "separates what all antiquity had confounded."[3]

After de Coulanges, the work of hisstudent Emile Durkheim on the evolution of society[4] and of Max Weber on ascetic Protestant sects brought the study of religious affiliations into the maelstrom of modernization theory itself. While the religious dimension has been neglected by some students of modernization, others, especially those of the Weberian

persuasion, have done important and impressive research in this area. Talcott Parsons, for example, has described the religious background of modern industrial society in an essay focusing largely on crucial turning points in the religious affiliations and values of western religion. He traces this history in terms of a chain of epochal separations, for example that of the religious community from its "ascriptive embeddedness" in ethnic and political identities, the individual from the church, and above all the conscience of the moral agent from the moral prescriptions imposed by religious and social bodies. The result of these crucial, historical disjunctions was then emergence of what he regards as the "modern" elements in Western civilization: the voluntary principle of religious and moral affiliations, denominational pluralism, toleration, and the extension of individual conscience and mutual trust.[5] The obverse side of this process is the reintegration of society at more inclusive levels of association. Hence the importance of the religious enfranchisements and the ecumenical value-concensus which he sees developing in step with increasing participation in political systems. The integrating force of "Judeo-Christian ecumenism," he maintains, "brings religious affiliation into line with secular citizenship and freedom of opportunity in the secular world."[6]

Studies of this sort have opened up for us the whole problem of the relationship between religious affiliations and historical change. But the question remains, how shall we go

about our study? Poincare was probably right in his daring oversimplification: "la méthode, c'est précisément le choix des faits." Yet surely there must be some guiding principles, some structural notions of social and cultural change that will help us "choose the facts." As we can see from our brief resume of the studies by de Coulanges and Parsons, a concept--if not the actual expression--which dominates much of the research on religious and social change, ancient and modern, is socio-cultural differentiation, or as I should prefer to say, social and cultural differentiation. By this is meant the growth of specificity, complexity and interrelatedness in the functions and structures of society and culture. S. N. Eisenstadt defines differentiation as a description of "the ways through which the main social functions or the major institutional spheres of society become dissassociated from one another, attached to specialized collectivities and roles, and organized in relatively specific and autonomous symbolic and organizational frameworks within the confines of the same institutionalized system."[7] This process takes place within society (e.g. among social roles and institutions) and within culture (e.g. the emergence of religious alternatives or "pluralism"). It also takes place between society and culture.[8] Social realities become juxtaposed to religious, philosophical, or cultural ideas so that a synchronic development of "the Real" and "the Ideal" can no longer be presupposed. The religious community becomes disoriented from the state. An

unprecedented tension arises between the way things are and the way they ought to be. Karl Jaspers, for example, in his analysis of the religious and cultural changes of the Axial Period (roughly 800 to 200 B.C.), finds that in societies from Greece to China

> man becomes conscious of Being as a whole, of himself and his limitations. He experiences the terror of the world and his own powerlessness. He asks radical questions. Face to face with the void he strives for liberation and redemption. By consciously recognizing his limits he sets himself the highest goals. He experiences absoluteness in the depths of selfhood and in the lucidity of transcendence. All this took place in reflection. Consciousness became once more conscious of itself, thinking became its own object.

After this rather heady, philosophical description, he goes on to point out the difference this breakthrough made to society.

> Spiritual conflicts arose, accompanied by attempts to convince others through the communication of thoughts, reasons and experiences. The most contradictory possibilities were essayed. Discussion, the formation of parties and the division of the spiritual realm into opposites which nonetheless remained related to one another, created unrest and movement to the very brink of spiritual chaos.[9]

From the comparative point of view, Jaspers' discussion of the Axial Period is somewhat limited since he restricts himself to a description of the cultural fissions within the consciousness of elite classes. Nevertheless, what we have here is an analysis of an emerging, archaic pluralism which was of such a magnitude as to create disruptions (differentiations) within and between society and its inherited cultural templates.

The distinctions between these three dimensions of

differentiation--that within society, within culture, and between the two--are of vital importance since changes in society and culture are not necessarily eurhythmic."[10] This is why I hesitate to use the expression "socio-cultural differentiation." Just as an economic system can become more complex than the social organization associated with it, a society may become more highly differentiated than its cultural blueprints. An example of this kind of dysrhythmic change is the totalitarianism imposed upon many of the technologically advanced societies of the twentieth century, including Japan.[11]

If social and historical change were synonymous with differentiation, the history of human societies would be reduced to a simple process of atomization. A theoretical counterbalance is needed. De Coulanges in the study mentioned above repeatedly stresses the progressive enfranchisement of the newly liberated classes which previously had been excluded from the political and religious life of the ancient city. In the end, even the plebeian was allowed to participate in the municipal cult."[12] Durkheim himself was keen to point out that the division of labor results in a new level of interdependence and interaction within society, or what he called "organic solidarity." Somehow or other, society must assimilate and adjust to its own growing complexity. Parsons stresses this point when he writes, "differentiation processes also pose new problems of integration."[13]

My decision to "choose the facts" on the basis of these

sociological concepts, differentiation and integration (or enfranchisement), immediately calls to mind the host of difficulties which surrounds the idea of modernization with which they are so intimately related. While I deliberately will focus my attention on the role of religious affiliations as symptoms of the modernization of Japanese society, I hope to avoid, wherever possible, the more obvious excesses of "modernization theory" itself. Dean C. Tipps has rightly pointed out that the difficulty posed by the concept of modernization stems from "its ability to evoke vague and generalized images which serve to summarize all the various transformations of social life attendant upon the rise of industrialization and the nation-state in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries."[14] The modernization theory, if it can be so designated or dignified, which I shall presuppose in this study is purposely of a low profile. This is so for two reasons. In the first place, it is my conviction that the less modernization implies theoretically, the more accurate our description of it is likely to be empirically. In the second place, while the concept of modernization generally implies the existence of some kind of syndrome of psychosocial and historical transformations, these clusters of changes with the "subsystems" of the social system cannot be easily predicted. Consequently, the idea of interrelated, necessary change among the parts of society which the theory seems to promote must always be weak and hypothetical. This is not to deny the existence of any eurhythmic or systemic

change, however. Far from it. I simply mean that such changes do not always take place as expected, and certainly do not always appear in the same way in all times and places. This I have already pointed out in the caveat lector above. I shall therefore use the word modernization to mean 1) the growth of social and economic differentiation and interdependence related to 2) a penumbra of secondary cultural changes. The relationship between these primary and secondary characteristics may be that of concomitant change or even cause and effect. Whether the relationships between these primary and secondary changes are concomitant or causal, they are in no way universal, even if they do sometimes fall into systemic patterns. It should be obvious from these remarks that I do not see any Weltplan in the processes of modernization. I do not even assume that modernization is a good thing. I shall therefore use the concept in a comparative way not in order to argue that Japan is either more or less "modern" than the West, but to compare the differences and similarities in the two cases measured in terms of the changing religious affiliations which have attended their movement toward modernity.

II. The Ancient and Early Medieval Period

A. The Lineage Ideology and Socio-Religious Monopolies in Ancient Japan

Various exclusive groups or cliques, prominent from the early historical period through the early Tokugawa shogunate, claimed exclusive control over both the sacred and secular

resources of society and may therefore be thought of as socio-religious monopolies. Only recognized members of these groups could enjoy the privileges and bear the obligations of their common religious life. Even though they were not necessarily consanguineous these monopolistic groups based their control over society on an ideology of lineage. Their ancestral deities were, or so they claimed, the founders of villages and clans. Others were culture heroes who had taught their descendants various arts and crafts. While these monopolistic groups were closed and exclusive they were flexible enough to incorporate--through the fiction of kinship--inferior classes and occupational groups. The latter were therefore semi-enfranchised members of the community who were allowed to participate in the affairs and ceremonies of the group in minor ways. Examples of such religious and social cliques are the ujigami (clan-god) faith of the ancient lineage groups (uji), the linked households (dōzoku), ujigami shrines and ujidera (clan temples) of the warrior class, various occupational and artistic guilds (za), and conservative parish guilds (miyaza) which controlled the affairs of Shinto parishes in the Capital Provinces. We should not forget that until the middle of the Heian period the court tried to exert a monopolistic control over Buddhism itself. Edicts from the eighth century--not to mention the sōniryō (rules for priests and nuns in the ritsuryō code)--prohibited Buddhist priests from preaching to the common people.[15] The state itself controlled ordination to the priesthood.

We know of no cultures in a pure undifferentiated stage. In Japan, prehistorians claim to have isolated several cultural strata coexisting even before the rise of the Yamato federation.[16] Nevertheless, there are indications that the level of differentiation both in culture and in society was comparatively low. Ritual (matsuri) was not clearly distinguished from political administration (matsuri-goto).[17] There was a significant lack of differentiation between the divine and human realms. Emperors, priests and shamans were seldom clearly distinguished from the gods or spirits they served. This is suggested by the etymology of the word kami itself which some scholars believe can be traced back to the Turco-Tartar qam, meaning not god but shaman. Perhaps more important was the fact that the ordinary Japanese became an ancestral deity after death. The "internal logic" of ancient shamanism, animism and ancestor worship therefore precluded any clear-cut distinctions between the human and the sacred worlds.

In ancient Japan ancestral deities were simultaneously gods of agriculture, water or mountains. The gods of kin and community were virtually indistinguishable from the gods of nature. Through nature they brought both bane and blessings upon the community. In the Kojiki's Age of the Gods about 190 deities are named, but only 20 of their names appear more than once in the text. Gods with specific functions or "personalities" therefore seem to be few in number. The ōkami of this period seem to be undifferentiated high gods which become

functionally specialized and schematized only as a result of ideological contrivance or political policy."[18]

As early as the Kofun period (c. 250-600 A.D.), some degree of social stratification was taking place in Japan. After the rise of the archaic Yamato state, a basic social dichotomy can be seen between the local folk (tami) on the one hand and the supra-local or intra-clan sphere of the elite (ōyake) on the other. Our earliest documentary evidence for the ancient clan system dates from the seventh century. To infer from this material the conditions of Japanese society in previous centuries is risky indeed. Already the clan system (ujikabane kokka) was in the process of being absorbed by a bureaucratic state (ritsuryō kokka) based on Chinese models. Our earliest documents therefore describe a clan system already in decline. The uji itself, far from being a simple exogamous clan, was a territorial group whose relative status was defined in terms of relationships with the Yamato court. Actual consanguinity may have played a role in the social solidarity of the upper strata of these groups (the ujibito, or "clansmen"). These kinship ties were extended fictitiously to include occupational corporations (be or tomo), other clients (ujiko) and slaves (yatsuko) under the control and protection of the ujibito. The clan itself--I shall use this traditional translation of the word uji--was therefore a closed but expansible organization. Whatever their nature in the earlier period, by the eighth and ninth centuries the clan-gods (ujigami) were

beginning to be regarded as ancestral deities.[19] The ideology of the Yamato court--the dominant clan--was likewise based on the fictitious notion that its ancestors were the gods who created Japan and established the state. The preface to the Kojiki tells us that this lineage ideology "is the framework of the state, the great foundation of the imperial influence."[20] Both at the local level of the folk and at the intra-clan level, the primary symbol of hierarchy and political integration was this ujigami. When clan migrations occurred, these gods were merely "split" (bunrei)--a theological operation suggesting the "segmentation" of groups at the level of society described by Durkheim as "mechanical solidarity."[21]

During this period the heads of the clans (uji-no-kami) also served as clan priests. Beginning with the seventh century these provincial strongmen were lured to the Yamato capital and transformed into a civil nobility (kuge), Japan's first aristocrats. Nevertheless, in the fourth and eleventh months of the year they continued to take leave of the court to return home and preside over the rituals of their ujigami.

The religious life of these local communities, which, following Chiba Masaji, I shall call the "festival faith," has proved to be remarkably long lived. Many conservative villages on remote islands or in mountainous areas display some of the same features today. This festival faith was, and is, characterized by 1) an emphasis on festivals and religious activity rather than on scriptures, sects and doctrines, 2) a continuity between

the social, political and sacred worlds, 3) a sense of religious identity, obligation and privilege based on groups rather than individuals, 4) a close connection between festivals, social controls and sanctions, and 5)--as long as the local community remains intact--a strong resistance to the introduction of gods or religious practices that would rival the indigenous ujigami.

While in folk Shinto the professional priest is a relatively recent phenomenon, in the larger shrines supported by the court and aristocracy religious professionals appeared early in history.[22] Emperors began to delegate some of their religious responsibilities and clans like the Imbe and Nakatomi assumed the role of religious specialists. Ujibito such as the Arakida, Watarai and Negi families at Ise began serving ujigami not regarded as their own ancestors. Because the ujigami enshrined at Ise was the ancestress of the imperial family, these ujibito worshipped their own clan deities at separate shrines within the precincts. Likewise the Kamo family which served as ujibito at the shrine bearing its name north of Kyoto, did not regard this deity as its own ancestor. Professional priesthoods of this sort continued to develop as land and buildings were donated to the shrines.

B. Warriors in the Early Medieval Period

During the Heian and Kamakura periods, the ruling elite became more openly differentiated into aristocrats and warriors. While the court turned to Exoteric and Esoteric Buddhism, the solidarity of warrior clans continued to rest upon their dōzoku

and ujigami. Thier patriarchal lineage ideology was to persist for centuries, even after the rise of warrior groups organized along the lines of a territorial society with tutelary deities. During the Kamakura period, warrior families began to build clan temples (ujidera) in imitation of those raised by aristocrats during the Heian period. Erected by and for these specific family lineages, the ujidera was a private institution. Some of them were established when the warrior himself took holy orders. Without retiring to a temple, these ordained warriors built chapels in their own residences. In other cases, their widows were ordained and, again without going into seclusion, built chapels for the repose of their husbands' souls. Most ujidera were therefore built without anyone's retiring from the world and were devoted to the long life of the warrior in this world and the salvation of his family in the next. In short, there was virtually no difference between the warrior's clan-Buddha (ujibutsu) and his Shinto ujigami. The fact that these temples appear in greatest numbers around the fourteenth century when the lineage ideology was coming under attack by a more complex society indicates that their purpose may have been to shore up this dōzoku symbol of the warrior class. Throughout their history these temples shared the turbulent ups and downs of their masters. After the defeat of a clan, the temple was either deserted or taken over by the new feudal lord. As time went on commoners took over many of these warrior temples, turning them into village temples (sonji) or

local Buddha halls (butsudō)t Many of them would later play important roles in the ikkō ikki rebellions.t[23] In a similar way, when temples in Kyoto began to fall prey to fire and earthquake, merchants and artisans stepped in to rebuild and support them since the temples' aristocratic patrons were no longer able to bear these financial burdens. Many of these temples (called machidō) in the merchants' quarters were converted into chapels (dojo) of pietistical movements such as Ippen's Ji sect. More notable however was the growth of the Lotus sect among these urban commercial classes.

C. Occupational Monopolies and Magic

Early occupational groups were also based on a lineage ideology. Mirror makers, jewelers, potters, brewers and others worshipped ancestral gods who, they believed, had founded their families and taught them their skills. These occupations were, in effect, monopolized by specific clans thought to possess a unique magical consciousness and mystique for their work. In Japan as elsewhere "magic protected techniques; behind magic they were able to make progress."t[24] Under the influence of immigrations from the mainland from about 270 to 500 A.D. occupations became more diversified. Because of the generally undifferentiated state of the economy monopolistic organizations were still necessary to accumulate capital and transmit skills. Gradually, however, artisans and artists began to turn to the court, to the aristocracy and to large temples and shrines for protection. Eventually the magical power of the

ancient artisan over his craft evolved into the mystique of the hereditary craftsman which can be seen in some of the traditional arts of Japan to this day. It is important to bear in mind that in earlier days a more magical version of this mystique served to perpetuate an economic monopoly over these crafts and trades.[25]

D. The Early Medieval Miyaza

The guilds of artisans and tradesmen which grew up in the shadows of medieval temples and shrines were often indistinguishable from the religious cliques (miyaza) which arose in Shinto parishes. The economic and the religious guilds (both called za) were monopolies which developed in the Capital Provinces at approximately the same time, the late Heian period. The names and functions of these groups were often identical. Only gradually did they become differentiated into religious, artisan, commercial and artistic guilds.

The miyaza came into existence between the time of the decline of the ancient clan system and the spread of the medieval manor (shōen)e Appearing primarily in areas of rapid economic growth and unstable class relations, the miyaza, like the commercial za, was a defensive institution. By claiming that their ancestors were contemporaries of the ujigami who had founded the community, the local establishment was able to assert its control over the Shinto shrine, irrigation, rights to common land and client families. In those parish guilds which developed in manors, the ranking leadership of the manor

served as leaders of the miyaza and as the priestly celebrants and oblationers of its shrines. Only those established families said to possess "stock" (kabu) were allowed to participate in the activities of these guilds (kabuza)t. A hierarchy was thereby established between members and non-members while a system of hereditary ranks developed within the miyaza itself.t[26]

III. The Establishment of Syncretistic Affiliations

A. The Growth of Multiplex Religious Affiliations

In spite of its conservative, monopolistic tendencies, the ujigami faith was complemented since earliest times by various other religious affiliations. After the capital was moved to Heian-kyō, the ujigami faith of the aristocrats became more complex. Clansmen began to worship the ujigami of other clans. At the Hirano shrine built by imperial command in the western suburbs of the capital as many as eight different clans worshipped one ujigami. As the great para-imperial families such as the Fujiwara expanded, branch shrines of their ujigami were established throughout the country.t[27] While branch shrines bearing the name of a parent deity are quite rare in the Engishiki (A.D. 927), their number increased greatly during the middle ages. The importance of the growth of these shrines lies in the fact that they were, in some sense, "alternatives" to enchorial ujigami cults. Big-name shrines such as Ise, Inari, Yasaka, Kasuga, Hiyoshi, and Hachiman succeeded in overcoming the resistance of local religious establishments and

settled down with, or actually absorbed, the indigenous deities of the village.

In the Kamakura period warrior families sometimes moved about the country in order to take up new responsibilities. To legitimate their new power base, territorial deities (chinjugami) were set up. Gods already well established in the region were generally designated as the deity of the estate and as the new lord's own ujigami. Sometimes a god related to the Hachiman deity of the Minamoto was brought to the region and enshrined. If the estate were owned by a large Buddhist temple, the tutelary Shinto deity of the main temple (e.g. Hiei's Hiyoshi Shrine or Kōfukuji's Kasuga Shrine) was installed. In other cases, the founder of the new line might be enshrined, or alternatively the original clan deity was simply "split" and taken to the new estate.

In spite of the prestige of the official chinjugami of the estate, veneration of the local deities continued. It was the custom for a new warrior chieftain to make the rounds of his estate and worship at local village shrines. Often, however, the gods were brought to the provincial capital where he could worship them with less trouble. This gave rise to a new kind of shrine, the "general shrine" (sōsha) or the rokusho no miyaę a shrine in which the warrior chieftain venerated the six most important deities of the estate. Such shrines were not, strictly speaking, ujigami, nor did they have a parish (ujiko) associated with them. Villagers, who were generally

oblivious to the ideological intent of these shrines, made use of them as they did any other place of worship: to insure plentiful harvests and the well-being of the local community. (Even amulets from the Grand Shrine of Ise were put out in the fields to act as scarecrows and fertility charms.) Nevertheless, the prestige associated with these official shrines and the religious practices of the warrior class persist to the present day in the customs, terminology, processions and institutions of village shrines.[28]

B. Functional or Specialized Deities

From earliest times, the ujigami cult was complemented by faith in specific or functional deities. As was mentioned above, there were only a few such deities in the Kojiki. The most important stimulus behind the differentiation among the Shinto deities was the introduction of Buddhism in the sixth century. While early Japanese Buddhists could scarcely tell one Buddha from another, Buddhist iconography soon began to display a capacity for making critical and orthodox distinctions. Under the influence of this art, statues of the Shinto kami were also made, indicating a clearer individuation among the gods. Served by Buddhist priests and rituals, flattered with such exotic titles as "Buddha" and "Bodhisattvaţ" the kami responded by becoming more "functional and personal."[29] Many of these specialized deities seem to have evolved out of the ujigami of specific clans.[30] Significantly, most of these functional deities made their first appearance in and around

the capital where the most highly developed culture and economy were to be found. In the more distant provinces there was no comparable growth of functional deities."[31] It was probably in the cults of these functional deities around the capital (e.g. the Gion festival of the Yasaka shrine) that Japanese festivals were transformed into spectacles and began to be "secularized." As Chiba Masaji puts it, external ceremony or festivities (sairei) became "differentiated from" the rituals of the festivals (saishiki)."[32]

C. Holy Men and Adventitious Deities

Together with these functional deities there evolved a new type of religious leadership and a new mode of religious affiliation. Under the ancient ritsuryō system, priests who ideally had deserted the world to live in seclusion were actually state servants. Even during the Nara period many monks illegally left their temples for private retreats in the mountains. There they planted the seeds of popular Buddhism which would sprout with figures such as Kūya (903-972) and Ryōnin (1072-1132) and finally come to bloom in the new Buddhism of the Kamakura period. The wandering holy men of the middle ages (hijiri, yamabushi, oshi, and shugenja) escaped the tutelage of the state by forgoing ordination. Religious "alternatives" from the outside world were transmitted to the closed society of manor and village primarily by these unordained priests of the common folk. Together with wandering entertainers and craftsmen they gathered at large shrines and temples which

were associated with the legends of famous saints of the past such as Kūkai, En no gyōja, or Shōtoku Taishi. They also congregated in market places which, compared with life on the manors, were relatively unrestricted. These were places where itinerant holy men and artisans could peddle their waresa-sacred and secularа-with comparative freedoma During the Heian period a number of the pilgrimage routes of the hijiri came under the control of the Shingon and Tendai sects.

The popular holy man of the middle ages carried with him a mixed bag of religious goods--Taoist magic and Buddhist and Shinto spells and practices. Some preached a single practice such as the nembutsu. Relying on their own charisma rather than ordination, they organized their followers in small confraternities (kō) and cultic orders.[33] As emissaries of functional deities, the hijiri were expected to have some kind of special knowledge about the spiritual world. Since Shintoa itself was lacking in such speculation, the growth of these professionals increased the role played by Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoistic speculation in folk religion. Thanks to them, knowledge of the high culture of the capital and its temples filtered down to the provincesa This religious lore was also appropriated and promoted by dominant provincial classes as a way of demonstrating their own unique status.a[34]

Even today outsiders sometimes are credited with magical powersa In Fukuoka Prefecture in the fishing village of Itoshima, there are women who trade the products of their village

for the cereals produced in the neighboring farming villages. These cereals are called the "first-fruits" (hatsuho) and cannot be eaten by the farmers before the trading takes place. Furthermore, if the ladies do not like the entertainment provided by the farmers, they may turn their baskets upside down, beat on them as though they were drums, and return to the village in a huff. It is believed that when this happens the households of the farmers who had displeased them will die out.[35]

Since the deities and Buddhas of the hijiri came to the local community from the outside world and provided some kind of "alternative" to the indigenous cult, we shall refer to them as adventitious deities (marōdogami)e The attraction of the adventitious deities was both thaumaturgical and soteriological. As functional deities they had special miraculous virtues (reigen) such as the ability to ensure safe childbirth, a good harvest, or the cure of various maladies. Others made possible instant enlightenment--or at least assured believers of rebirth in the Pure Land after death. In the eyes of the villager, the deity and his messenger were not always clearly distinguished. The missionary's residence sometimes evolved into the shrine of the marōdogami. In other cases, villagers themselves sought out an adventitious deity and enshrined it in the precints of their own ujigami. By giving their heretofore nameless deity the name of a prestigious provincial or national god they sought to insure the continued wellebeing of the local cult while enhancing the good name of the village itself.

Two types of religious affiliation emerged from thist the one based on the local deity, the other on faith in a deity from the world outside the community. These alternatives can be summarized as follows.t[36]

LOCAL PATTERN (ujigami)	ADVENTITIOUS PATTERN (marōdogami)
integrates community and kin	establishes a community of believers apart from the natural community and kinship groups
exclusive	inclusive, missionary faith
undifferentiated functions	strong personality and particular functions
"particularistic" relations with its own clan or kin based on genealogy and/or geography	a relation between the sacred and man based on faith. (This is especially true of confraternities of the Kamakura Buddhist sects based on a "single practice.")
authority of deity reflected in political, economic, social and cultural circumstances of adherents	authority of deity reflected in the magico-religious power of its transmitter (missionary, shaman, hero), his techniques of ecstasy, and his socio-political and economic situation
(generally) routinized leadership based on a rotating lay-priesthood	(often) a charismatic leadership developing later into hereditary priesthoods

D. Confraternities and the Spread of Adventitious Deities

The confraternities which played such an important role in the spread of the adventitious deities and Buddhas have a pedigree going back to Shōtoku Taishi. Shōtoku is alleged to have instituted special meetings (e) for the study of various Buddhist sutras. Actually the purpose of these lectures was often of a magical nature. They were believed to enhance the

power and wealth of the nation, insure health of the emperor or other patrons, and to ward off natural disasters and plagues. Gradually the purpose of theseee changed from protecting the nation to bringing happiness in the hereafter to ancestral souls, and therefore came to be held on the anniversary of their death-day. Commoners were not allowed to participate in these assemblies until after the Heian period.[37] These early confraternities reached a decisive turning point with the spread of the New Buddhism of the Kamakura period, the Zen, Nichiren, and the Pure Land sects. The Ikkō sect, for example, began to hold hō-on-kō on Shinranės death-day to give thanks for the blessings of the founder and to strengthen the bonds of fellowship. In confraternities of this sort faith and religious "voluntarism" took on a new importance. The result was the emergence of a type of religious affėliation which had at least the potential for transcending the bonds of kin and local community.[38]

The processes whereby confraternities of an adventitėous deity become established in villages gives us some idea of the ways in which external cults were indigenized in general. Often the confraternity had a dual leadership made up of missionaėries from the outside and stalwarts of the cult within the community. The new cult was propagated most successfully when the missionary was able to befriend the local establishment and the priest of the Shinto shrine. In new villages or in villages where the cooperatėve spirit of the community had weakened, the new faith made rapid headway. Often the adventitious god was actuallye

amalgamated with the indigenous deity. When this happened, the local deity acquired a name, a set of specific functions and a more definite "personality." This process of acculturation was hastened when the village was located close to the main shrine of the outside deity. In the Capital Provinces, for example, many village deities were called Ise-sama, whereas in distant Hokkaidō missionaries from Ise were able to establish only branch shrines of their cult. Often the temporary residence of the missionary served as an ersatz pilgrimage site for those unable to make the long journey to Ise. Aside from sheer distance, the process of assimilation was also slowed down by the degree of strangeness of the new deity. The more the cult of the marōdogami resembled that of the ujigami, the more readily it was accepted by the community. For example, the Ise faith, which resonated deeply with the ujigami faith, was absorbed more rapidly than the hō-on-kō of Pure Land Buddhism. Once accepted by a village, the confraternity became integrated into the structure of the local cult by patterning its festivals and religious concepts after those already familiar in the village, and by gradually substituting for its own discipline the distribution of wonder-working amulets throughout the village. As in other religious traditions, magic was a more effective evangelistic technique than discipline."[39]

E. Syncretism as "Centripetal Differentiation"

Such were the logistics of acculturation. But the question remains: why did this result in syncretism and not pluralism?

Part of the answer to this question lies in the high value placed on consensus in agrarian societies based on intensive, cooperative labor. Once the marōdogami entered the village, attitudes of "hospitality"[40] and harmony undoubtedly helped to dampen religious and social conflict. But the ultimate reason for the emergence of syncretism lay in the dependency of the traditional village. While its ethos and attitude were exclusive and particularistic, the local community was both vulnerable to outside attack and dependent upon the outside world for protection. While it had its own internal political culture and leadership, ultimate power and authority came from outside. It is therefore not surprising that the mythical charter of Japanese sacred kingship itself, the tenson-kōrin myth, was based on a shamanistic or marōdogami kind of scenario.[41] Such myths seem to indicate that

> supernatural powers and superior culture usually came from the outside to the exclusive in-group society. . . . The idea of a super-natural power and superior culture coming from outside was probably related to general feelings of inferiority among the ancient villagers, who were aware of community exclusiveness and isolation. At the same time, they may have been conscious of cultural and religious distinctions between their own group and the out-groups, and felt a certain longing for the outsiders' cultures.[42]

Unlike the Abrahamic traditions in which social integration rested upon one God, one faith and one religious practice, political and social integration in Japan has traditionally been based upon a multiplicity of gods and faiths. Significantly, the theological articulation of this syncretism (honji-suijaku

setsu) emerged during the tenth through the twelfth centuries when the manorial system was becoming dominant. Shinto deities which had long been regarded as "sentient beings" in need of the Buddha's salvation themselves, or as guardians of Buddhist temples, were now declared to be manifestations of the various Buddhas. After the middle of the Heian period, having lost imperial support, temples made use of this syncretistic theory to amalgamate Buddhism with the religious customs of the manors they controlled. Equally mundane were the reasons for the amalgamation of the ujigami of the warrior class with the indigenous deities of their estates.[43] Whereas in the West it was heresy (i.e. medieval pluralism) which threatened the unity of Christendom, in Japan the emphasis on a "single practice" which appears in Kamakura Buddhism posed the greatest spiritual menace to the integration of society. In the course of time both the Pure Land and Nichiren sects became deeply involved in rebellion. Under such circumstances, in order to avoid conflict with the religious establishment of the community the new religious alternative represented by the marodogami was generally treated as a supplement to the traditional devoirs of village and family. Grafted into these primary groups, participation in the confraternity of the adventitious deity became obligatory, and then hereditary. In the end, it ceased to be a real alternative at all. The result was therefore syncretism, or what more technically might be called "centripetal social and cultural differentiation."

IV. The Late Medieval Period

A. The Development of a More Complex Society

As we approach the history of religious affiliationsnin the Late Medieval Period we come into relatively uncharted waters. Many histories of Japanese religion fail to devote so much as a single chapter to this period. Usually the events of the Ashikaga shogunate (1338-1568) are treated as an appendage to--or a mere degeneration of--the religion of the Kamakura period. Even then, the treatment of religious life during the period is often limited to such things as the rise of the Rinzai sect and the Gozan temples, the development of a new religious aesthetic, and the renewed influence of China and Chinese monks. An equally unsatisfactory approach gives sole credit to the Tokugawa period for the changes that actually began in Ashikaga. This tendency can be seen in the works of Tsuji Zennosuke and those who have followed him. Looking for the reasons of the "decline" of Buddhism in the modern period, many scholars have laid the blame primarily upon the Tokugawa shogunate which, in fact, had made the temples an arm of the state. Unfortunately, this exaggerated interest in the corrupting influence of the Tokugawa regime on Buddhism has caused the best of scholars to overlook the still more decisive influences of the ground-swell of economic and social change upon religious institutions even before Tokugawa. Much of the history of the Ashikaga period is undeniably confusing and even unpleasant. The last half of the age--the Warring States

Period (1467-1568) was a time of military turmoil and political fragmentation. Most of the major temples and sects had their own armies to defend and extend their property and power. In such an age there were none who could match, and few who could understand, the profundity of Dōgen or Shinran. No one inherited the charismatic mantle of the prophet Nichiren. It was, in fact, an age of epigoni. One can easily forgive the scholar who hesitates to spend his time studying the lesser luminaries of the age--figures bearing such unmemorable names as Nikkō (there were actually two of them), Nisshō, Nichirō, Nichiji, Nitchō, Nichijū, and Nisshin, just to mention some of the successors of Nichiren. What is harder to absolve is the failure of so many historians to see and record the most crucial developments of the period. In some cases this seems to be the result of a scholarly penchant which equates the history of religion with the history of the main temples of the established sects, their high priests and pontiffs, and the religious ideas they taught. As we shall see, the most important religious changes of this period grew out of that side of life which, we are sometimes told, is "below" ideas. If we are to understand the importance of Late Medieval Japanese religion it is clear that we must deal with that neglected stratum of evidence which lies beneath the official records of those who during this period sought, and fought, to inherit the leadership of the Buddhist sects founded during the preceding 700 years.

During the Late Medieval Period many aspects of the

religious affiliations of previous centuries continued in force. The lineage ideology, for example, persisted in a modified form and was finally adopted by smaller family units. The confraternities of the early middle ages continued to grow, spreading the New Buddhism of the Kamakura period among various social and economic classes during the Muromachi period. With the growing division of labor and the subsequent definition of social groups under the Tokugawa regime monopolistic groups of artisans became even more distinct and numerous.[44] A distinctive commercial ethic and ethos, standards for trade and instruction, came into existence.a[45] Guilds were formally licensed by the government.a[46] Many guildsmen continued to worship the ancient deities of their trade. Others worshipped a common ujigami, ubusunagami or household deity. Those who worked in the mountains--hunters, woodcutters and charcoal makers--bound themselves together in confraternities dedicated to the worship of various mountain deities. Carpenters, plasterers, thatchers, blacksmiths, and coopers formed confraternities for the worship of Shotoku Taishi. Financial agreements were drawn up while feasting in the presence of this god or culture hero. Horse dealers made their contracts before a statue of Horse-headed Kannon and had masses said for the repose of the souls of dead animals.

In spite of this continuity, the transformations of religious affiliations and institutions during this period were most remarkable. Not all parts of the country, however, were

affected to the same degree. During the Ashikaga period, the Kinki, Chūgoku, Hokuriku and Tōkaidō regions underwent rapid economic and religious change. This contrasted strongly with comparatively backward and religiously conservative regions such as Kantō, Tōhoku and Kyūshū. In the more advanced parts of the country the great warrior households had lost their monopolistic control over agricultural tools as early as the Kamakura period. Finally even the lower peasant classes were able to own tools and domestic animals. Double cropping became widespread during the Kamakura period, so that by the Ashikaga period the yield of rice as much as doubled. The system of land tenure in these parts also differeda from the rest of Japan. While the medieval land system (myōden) remained intact in the east, here a single cultivator might hold land rights (shiki) as a proprietor, while owning other shiki as a cultivator or sub-cultivator of the land. Compared with estates in eastern Japan, the land in these economically advanced parts of the country tended to be divided into smaller units not differing greatly in size. The system of overlapping land rights gradually broke down the absolute distinction between lord and peasant, proprietor and cultivator, and loosened class differentials in general. Nevertheless the relatively small scale landholders called myōshu became the dominant class in these areas.

During the Tokugawa period, the system of cultivation in the Capital Provinces, which had been based on kinship affilia-

tions, was gradually transformed into a tenant-farmer system. This caused labor relations which had previously been embedded in complex networks of religious and social obligations to be differentiated emotionally and conceptually from other responsibilities. Traditional, paternalistic bonds were replaced by contractual relationshipst As Thomas Smith points out, these new relations "were not relationships of indefinite term expected to go on and on, but relations entered into for the convenience of the moment, so that instead of being the guide lines of a way of life, they were episodes that passed and were quickly forgotten."[47]

In the less developed parts of Japan the story was much different. There, since the Kamakura period, various estate offices were generally held by one and the same family. Land holdings were of much greater scale than elsewhere since shiki rarely fell into the hands of the lower classes. Domestic animals and farm tools continued to be owned by these dominant classes. Whereas markets and money began to affect even the lower classes in the more advanced parts of the country, in the east manors continued to be economically isolated and self-supporting for centuries. The money economy that finally did develop even in the east later on was created initially by the transformation of land-taxes (paid in kind) into cash by the daimyō in markets they controlled. For this reason a true surplus economy was slow to develop.t[48]

It was in the Capital Provinces and other parts of the country undergoing more rapid social and economic differentiation

that we find the emergence of classes with a natural, "elective affinity" for new modes of religious affiliation. Many of the most important changes in the religious communities of the Late Medieval period took place within new semi-autonomous villages called sō ortgō. During the political chaos of the early fourteenth century when many of the warrior dōzoku began to decline, petty manorial leaders and their dependents in the Capital Provinces began to form territorial federations to protect themselves and their own interests. Many of these areas became centers of provincial manufactures and crafts, or enjoyed a tradition of providing special foodstuffs for the imperial court. This presumably gave them some leverage in their struggles with the lords of the surrounding manors.[49] Gradually these villages became virtually corporate persons in the farming of taxes (jigeuke)t, litigation, self-defense, legislation dealing with local matters, irrigation, drainage, access to common property and the conduct of festivals.

B. The Miyaza in the Late Medieval Period

Unlike Tōhoku, where one dōzoku was often able to dominate an entire community, the sō of the Capital Provinces were controlled by groups of relatively autonomous families. These families, which often belonged simultaneously to the warrior and cultivator classes, were variously known as otona, toshiyori, sata(nin), myōshu etc. Incidentally, these terms are identical with the titles used by the leaders of the new Shinto parish guilds which developed throughout the sō.[50] The materialization

of parish guilds in these turbulent villages seems to lend added credence to Smith's observation that "the miyaza appeared only where the structure of privilege was relatively insecure and required exceptionally elaborate institutional support."[51]

The monopoly exercized by such guilds was not usually legitimated by myth, say in the way the ancient court had used the tales of the Kojiki to buttress its claim to hegemony. Instead, by presiding over the ceremonies of their shrine, guild leaders seemed to act out symbolically their domination of all other aspects of the community. One exception to this rule--a case where myth was used by a guild--also happens to be a good example of the establishment of monopoly and its subsequent fate.

A parish guild was established by a clique of cultivators and merchants in Tokuchin-ho of Imabori-gō in Ōmi (Shiga Prefecture) at the Hiyoshi Shrine in the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century. By 1488 the growing social differentiation and economic rivalries of the area had resulted in the division of the guild into East and West sections. By 1566 each of these sections had to be further subdivided into Left and Right guilds, resulting in a total of four sub-groups.[52] According to a legend handed down by these guilds, a certain Bōtarō, a trader in horses and cattle, lived in Imabori during the twelfth century. A powerful and influential man, Bōtarō plied his trade throughout the land. Once while visiting Nara he saw a sign announcing an award which was being offered to any person

who could kill the man-eating serpent which lived in the Saru-taku Pond. Bōtarō immediately tethered his animals, pulled out a dagger and plunged into the pond where, as might be expected, he slew the serpent and split open its head. The people of the neighborhood who had long been terrorized by the creature rejoiced to see the pond run red with its blood. When Emperor Goshirakawa heard of this exploit, he decided to bestow upon the hero whatever boon he asked. Now, it used to happen that as Bōtarō drove his herds along the roads they would stop and graze in the fields, causing much consternation among the farmers. Bōtarō therefore asked the emperor to give his animals the right to graze along the side of all the roads he passed. The wish was granted and the emperor bestowed upon him a charter describing his privileges. This document, dated 1157, became the mythological charter for the cattle merchants in the gō who as members of the miyaza sought to monopolize the trade in cattle and horses in the area. Even after this monopoly was broken up by the free market policy oftOda Nobunaga in the late sixteenth century, this document continued to be enshrined and worshipped by the people as a disease curing amulet. Once a year the lay-priest of the parish guild went to the shrine early in the morning and reverently brought forth the charter-talisman from its storage place. Holding it above his head, the villagers passed beneath, praying for relief from their ailments. The custom died out only in the early twentieth century.t[53]

More typical of the fate of the miyaza in the Late

Medieval period is the parish guild in Kamikawarabayashi Village located just outside Osaka. Cotton was introduced into this region in the late seventeenth century and became a cash-crop of considerable importance.[54] After Genroku (1688), the region was characterized by an increase in productivity, higher taxes and an intensification of class differences. As a result of changes in the mode of agricultural production, there was a remarkable decline in the number of hereditary servants, their place being taken by hōkōnin, a kind of rural proletariat. Finally, however, even these hōkōnin were replaced by day-laborers. These important changes in the economy and class-structure of the village also affected the composition of the local religious guild, or hongannin as it was called. The chart on p. 45 shows the relationship between membership in the guild and economic power in the year 1673.t[55] It shows that membership was generally commensurate with wealth (measured in koku, or yields), but that this was not a one-to-one relationship. Other factors were at work in determining household status, for example, the age of the lineage. The changes that took place in the social structure of this village from 1673 on seem to have affected primarily the lower class households (genin iemochi and garazaike) and "retired" families which made up more than half of the families not enfranchised in 1673. The heads of these families turned their property over to their eldest sons and retired with their younger sons to form branch families. As such they enjoyed a "tax shelter" even though they were not

totels	NON-ENFRANCHISED (hiyakunin)						ENFRANCHISED (yakunin)			status / yield (in koku*)
	others	priest	hair dresser	lower class house-holders	garazai families	retired	half privi-leged	wholly privi-leged	head-man	
1									1	30-40
										25-30
2								2		20-25
13		1				3	1	8		15-20
10				1		1	1	7		10-15
6						2		4		5-10
8			2	1	1	2	1	1		0-5
19	3			3	2	11				no yield
59	3	1	2	5	3	19	3	22	1	totals
	33						26			

1 koku = 4.9629 bushels

badly off. Because of the obvious unfairness of their status, these families were gradually enfranchised from this time on. In 1689, the number of enfranchised families rose from 26 to 37, while those not enfranchised went down to 24.[56] In 1732, enfranchised families had risen to 38, the disenfranchised to 31. These changes in the composition of the guild suggest that the once fixed stem-branch type relations among the families of the village were breaking down. Personal ties based on reciprocity, cooperation and religious obligation were replaced by contractual relations. Guild membership came to be purchased as an appurtenance to a piece of land. In short, religious affiliations were greatly altered by the growing social and economic differentiation of the community.

The progressive enfranchisement that took place in this village transformed the local guild from a privileged clique (kabuza) into a more broadly based village guild, or muraza. This extension of privileges was aided by the addition of lower levels of enfranchisement which entitled other families to a smaller share in the privileges of the guild. The deity of the village also underwent the typical transformation from clan deity to tutelary deity.

From the example of Kamikawarabayashi Village, it is obvious that the hiyakunin were not enfranchised on the basis of any abstract democratic principle or in a sudden, revolutionary way. On the contrary, more and more families were incorporated into the leadership of the parish through a series of gradually

expanding enclosures until nearly all villagers, or rather all adult males, were included.

A review of the overall history of the miyaza in the Capital Provinces during the Tokugawa period shows that the institution declined as the economic power of lower-class peasants increased. In the early seventeenth century traditional parish guilds were still dominated by the descendants of the myōshu class. Nevertheless, inroads were already being made into their power by the new rich who were gaining access to the miyaza or forming their own secondary, or auxiliary, guilds. After the shogunate commanded the bushi to retire to castle towns (or, if they chose to remain, to give up their swords and become farmers) the miyaza, freed from warrior control, began to fall into the hands of rising peasant classes. By the late seventeenth century many of the older families which remained in the guilds were no longer able to fulfill their financial obligations to the institution. This led to intensified squabbling between the guild members and the disenfranchised families of the community. From about 1780 to 1845 guilds throughout western Japan were beginning to open up to more enterprising families. By this time miyaza members were no longer better off than other villagers. When positions of leadership fell vacant they were filled by anybody who had lived in the area for a certain length of time, who was able to make financial contributions to the guild and who was regarded as a person of good character.[57] This process of demonopolization (or

enfranchisement) would finally result in the emergence of the territorial parish (ujiko) of the Tokugawa and Meiji periods.

C. The Development of the "Territorial Parish"

In its complex documentary history, the changes in the words used for the Shinto parish (and its gods) often reflect crucial shifts in the class structure which supported and dominated the institution. We have seen that in the Ancient and Early Medieval Periods, the uji-no-kami and ujibito were in control of indigenous community cults. In time, the ujibito became too absorbed in the affairs of the capital to return to their homes to preside over festivals. With the collapse of the clan system and the decline of the ujibito, control over these local cults began to fall into the hands of inferior classes, the "children of the clan" or ujiko.[58] From the middle of the Kamakura period through the Muromachi period the term ujibito began to be applied fictitiously to various festival organizations, especially to groups of believers connected with shrines and temples in the gō. In some places the ujiko itself began to take on the characteristics of an exclusive group. Documents which use the word ujiko in contrast to the common people of the village (murabito) suggest that the "children of the clan" had begun to occupy the monopolistic position once held by the ujibito themselves.[59] Such ujiko were probably little different from the miyaza which we have been discussing. One also notices the influence of the dōzoku in the makeup of these groups. In the thirteenth century,

various documents, including references by Nichiren, use the word ujiko more broadly to denote groups organized to seek divine favors and protection. In spite of its obviously Shinto connotations, the word ujiko is even found in Buddhist sermons for groups under the Buddha's protection.

However complicated the history of the word is, it is clear that in the economically advanced sō and gō of the Capital Provinces the ujiko and the ujigami were first--as Japanese scholars are wont to say--"territorialized." Documents from the Ōmi region suggest that by about 1600 A.D. the word ujiko had begun to replace murabito as the name for the most inclusive, residential body responsible for the cult of the territorial god (now called, indiscriminately, ujigami, ubusuna-gami, or chinju-gami)t. By the end of the century this territorial implication of the term ujiko had become nearly universal. The farther away one moves from the Capital Provinces, however, the more delayed is the development of these territorial parishes. These verbal changes, far from being accidental, seem to be a reflection of the rise of small client farmers to places of power and responsibility in these communities.t[60]

A number of Japanese scholars have discussed the transformation of the ujigami from a lineage deity into a territorial god of the modern Shinto parish. This change, some argue, is a reflection of the more basic decline of consanguinity as the basis of social solidarity and the emergence of territorial communities in which a plurality of unrelated households lived

together. Others dispute this interpretation.[61] Ariga, for example, argues that clans from the beginning were territorial and political groups held together not by real kinship but by fictive ancestors (shutsuji no senzo)t In contrast to the ancestor worship which became the province of Buddhism, these fictive (or ideological) ancestors were worshipped by people standing before shrines, rather than kneeling before graves or Buddhist altars. Their death-pollution was dealt with by Shinto rather than Buddhist rites. Because the social prestige and religio-magical efficacy associated with these fictive ancestors were so greatt, their worship naturally filtered down to the lower classes. At the lower end of the social scale, although these deities were enshrined in the family'ts Shinto altar, they were not regarded as ancestors since, as Ariga points out, nobody would believe that such families could have such illustrious progenitors.

If Japanese society did not change from a kinship base to a territorial one tout simple, it is nevertheless true that with the rise of more independent households and the increasing population mobility of the Late Medieval Period the idea of kinship with a clan-god came to be used in a more openly fictitious way. By the beginning of the Tokugawa period only in Tōhoku and in Kagoshima in southern Kyūshū did a literal clan-god continue to exist. In other places the lineage ideology embedded in the ujigami cult gave way to a territorial concept. The otherwise contradictory expression "the ujūgami of such-

and-such a place" became, and still is, an everyday expression. Whether the deities of the dōzoku of the earlier period became amalgamated with the deities of the community (as Yanagita suggests) or whether they became the ancestors of smaller families, the implication is cleart lineage deities were losing their grip.t[62] This shift in the way of talking about deities and parishes was, of course, extremely important. Gods which had once been the symbols of socio-religious cliques now became the focal point of a wider territorial integration of society. This was especially evident when new villages were founded by more than one kinship group. Under these circumstances household deities were often transformed into gods of the new "territorial society."[63]

D. Buddhist Institutions

When we turn to religious affiliations with Buddhist institutions during the Late Medieval Period, once again the semi-autonomous villages of the Capital Provinces were the harbingers of change. Even before the promulgation of the temple registration (tera-uke) system of the Tokugawa period, a new and intense family consciousness had spread to the rising lower classes of these villages.t Being a family associated with a temple, a danka, implied that the family had recognized ancestors. Having such ancestors was proof of the independence and worthiness of the household. The practices of these villages therefore anticipated the family-temple system created by the Tokugawa government.[64] Needless to say, the subsequent

rulings of the Tokugawa bakufu enhanced this growing family consciousness. In cities as well as in villages, new temple registers put landlords and renters on the same footing. Both had ancestors and were therefore, as it were, "legitimate."

In the late Muromachi period, the leaders of these new family temples were often the otona class which controlled the sō andtgō. The seating arrangements in these temples--always symbolic of rank--were virtually the same as those in the miyaza, which were dominated by the same class. The rights of temple families varied considerably. The rights of the "founding temple families" (kaiki danka)t, recognized by the bakufu itself, included the right to make various financial decisions and to appoint the local priest. On the other hand, commoners belonging to temples owned by manors had very few rights. Daimyō who supported temples as danka naturally had nearly absolute control over their affairs. The family temple of commoners in more autonomous areas of the country stood between these extremes. Because such temples depended upon these families for financial support, the laymen played a large role in their management, and even had a voice in approving or disapproving a new priest. These danka had obligations as well as rights. If they failed to make contributions to their temple they could be refused the required temple certificate. In extreme cases they might be ousted from the temple or denied burial in its graveyard.t[65]

During the late sixteenth century, the otona and other

well-to-do villagers began to invite hijiri to settle down and become priests of local temples and shrines. For the first time many anonymous places of worship acquired a name, a history (often fabricated), and even a sectarian identity. Many ujidera once owned by medieval warriors were taken over by villages, hamlets or other territorial groups (kumi, kaito, buraku, etc.) and transformed into community property. Small Buddha-halls (butsudō) enshrining such Buddhas as Kannon, Jizō or Yakushi, remained focal points of local culture and entertainment and never became connected with any particular sect. Most of these butsudō were prayer temples (kitō-ji) where suffrages were offered not only for families but for individuals and the community itself. These temples, which were regarded as village property (sonji), often became the meeting place for temple guilds (teraza), institutions which were nearly identical with the Shinto miyaza.

In the past, only the Nichiren sects had insisted that all members of a family, including the servants, be members of the same temple. It was only in the Tokugawa period however--and then only because of pressure from the government--that it became customary for entire families to belong to one family temple. Before the government's order in 1788 that all members of a family belong to the same sect, husbands and wives sometimes belonged to different temples. In such cases, the children would generally be enrolled in the father's temple. Sometimes, however, the daughters would join their mothers

temple, the sons their father's. This kind of split affiliation seems to have been found primarily among the middle and lower classes, i.e. in households which had no clients to control. The freedom to change a family's temple affiliation which had been recognized by the government in 1665 was taken away by official regulations in 1772. The government finally realized that changing temple affiliations made it all the more difficult to keep track of the population.

When it finally became mandatory for families to join a family temple, family ties, neighborhood obligations and local power relations often determined which temple a family chose. Class also entered into the picture. In some villages, for example, families belonging to one family temple were all members of the Old Guild of the Shinto shrine. Members of another family temple in the same community might be members of a rival New Guild. In other places, client families were all danka of the local Pure Land or True Pure Land temple while their patrons were affiliated with a Zen or Nichiren sect. Often the True Pure Land sect attracted the lowest class danka. Only a few of the wealthier merchants were found in this sect.[66]

The Late Medieval Period also saw the decline of the medieval "general cemetery" and the growth of cemeteries attached to family temples. It was only during the Tokugawa period that the average temple began to manage funerals itself. Before this, death was generally handled by confraternities or neighborhood associations. Since graves could not be moved

when a family settled in a new community, a family's temple affiliations did not always coincide with its place of residence.[67t] Stone grave markers became common after the introduction of the tera-uke system and symbolized the new independence of the smaller families. The ancestral services of the medieval warrior now became the standard funeral of all classes. The homes of even lower-class families became important places for Buddhist worship. Under the tera-uke system all families wanted their own Buddhist altar (butsudan) as a symbol of their proper registration and affiliation with such-and-such a sect. Whereas previously only warriors needed a special room for the observances connected with their ancestral cult, after the late seventeenth century it became common for even ordinary peasants to have a special room or alcove set aside for the butsudan. These rooms were used for saying masses for the dead, for funerals and meetings of confraternities.

E. The Influence of Pilgrimage on Religious Institutions

We have seen how during the Early Middle Ages holy men wandered through the countryside establishing confraternities and cultic orders dedicated to the worship of adventitious deities and Buddhas. We have also seen that in the Late Medieval Period these wayfarers began to settle down and serve as priests in shrines and family temples. As these religious virtuosi became sedentary, the common people became mobile. Whereas in the Early Medieval Period the hijiri had brought the marōdogami, his miracles, spells and amulets to the villagers,

it was now the latter who, as pilgrims, began to visit the marōdogami at his native shrine. This increase in pilgrimage was due primarily to the improved financial position of the lower classes, the pacification of the country, and the spread of better and safer transportation during the Tokugawa period. While there are records of okagemairi dating from the middle of the sixteenth century, after the beginning of the eighteenth century participants in these pilgrimages to Ise quadrupled.[68] At the peak of the pilgrimage season to the Kumano shrines in southern Kii (Wakayama Prefecture) in 1716 as many as 4,776 people stayed in the inns of Tanabe during one week alone. Twenty-two years later about 758 people put up in these inns on one day alone.[69] In this period there was even the custom, called sensharei, of visiting a thousand shrines and pasting to them pieces of paper stamped with one's name. Some people spent so much time roaming about the countryside on pilgrimages that they were criticized for "pestering" the gods.[70] When pilgrims became too numerous to be accommodated by temple inns (shukubō), purely commercial inns began to spring up along the pilgrimage routes. Since there were no priests to instill an atmosphere of respect, and because the Buddhist dietary restrictions could easily be neglected, a holiday atmosphere arose which characterizes Japanese "pilgrimage" to this day. Before this, as Yanagita points out, the dangers and difficulties of travel forced the pilgrim to have faith.[71]

The surge of popular pilgrimage during the Tokugawa

period was made possible by a specific type of religious affiliation, the representational confraternity (daisankō)a Members of such groups pooled their resources so that at least one of their number (chosen by lot or rotation) could go to Ise, Kumano, Konpira in Shikoku, Dewasanzan in Tōhoku, Dazaifu in Kyūshū or elsewhere to worship and secure amulets for the whole groupa The daisankō was only one of several types of confraternity which flourished during the Late Medieval Period. Some kō were organized for the worship of nature deities such as mountain or field gods, the sun or the moon. Others were devoted to the cult of the ujigami of a particular place. Related to these groups were the kiriake-kō which gathered twice a year to worship the ancestors who had founded the village. Groups of this sort were probably among the oldest confraternities in Japan and are difficult to distinguish from the parish per se. Because taking part in the activities of these groups was closely related to a family's identity as a member of the community, participation was generally obligatory. In addition to their religious activities, members of these village-wide confraternities were involved in an encompassing network of social obligations such as repairing roads, dams and bridges. Some were, in fact, virtually identical with such territorial organizations as the kumi.[72]

Quite different were those confraternities whose boundaries extended beyond the local community. Confraternities devoted to the worship of Amida, Kannon, Jizō or æther Buddhist deities are examples of this type. Many of these deities had

originally been patronized by the court and came under the protection of local villages only after the decline of the aristocratic and warrior classes. Like the representational confraternities, these kō shared a common faith with believers in other villages. Participation in these groups was comparatively voluntary.[73]

F. The Spread of the Honganji Sect

The most powerful of these confraternities were those organized under the aegis of the Honganji sect of Pure Land Buddhism. The collapsing manorial system and the rising sō and gō type villages (with their small scale proprietors, or myōshu) of the Kinki, Chūgoku, Hokuriku, and Tōkaidō areas provided fertile soil for the growth of this sect. Unlike other Buddhist sects which had arisen during the Heian and Kamakura periods, the Honganji sect relied directly upon the contributions of the faithful for its financial and military support. Because it was no longer beholden to the medieval manor for its support, the dōjō and kō of the sect naturally became the breeding grounds for unrest and rebellion. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries confraternities of this Pure Land sect (sometimes called Ikkō) became involved in violent uprisings called Ikkō-ikki.[74] In eastern Japan, however, the sect failed to grow in spite of Shinran's twenty year ministry and Rennyo's three missionary journeys. In 1465 even the Senshuji-ha, another Pure Land sect, found it advantageous to move from Kantō to the Ise area in western Japan. In the east, not only

was there no class comparable to the myōshu of western Japan to support the sect; the powerful eastern daimyō actively discouraged the spread of nembutsu-kō by force of arms. After the Sengoku period, when it was no longer possible to restrict the sect forcibly, many daimyō became members themselves. By so doing they were able to manipulate (and neutralize) these groups from within. Honganji's potential for developing into a radical (and nearly monotheistic) alternative to the syncretistic mainstream of Japanese religion, was also undercut by various theological compromises promulgated by the leadership of the sect itself.

G. A Typology of the Kō

Ikeda Yoshisuke has constructed a typology of these confraternities which helps to clarify the roles they played in Japanese society. Defining kō as "common interest associations" he classifies them according to their relationships with the community as a whole. There are three types:

I. Those which transcend the local community.

II. Those which are coextensive with the local community.

III. Those which are subsumed by the local community.

Type I confraternities have supra-territorial connections and therefore tend to have a centrifugal effect upon the local community. For example there were the Pure Land confraternities of some provinces which began to take a highly critical attitude towards the local ujigami and finally became involved in the

Ikkō-ikki rebellions mentioned above. Type II confraternities are common interest associations or associations based on faith. Nevertheless, they are not generally voluntary associations.[76] Because membership in these confraternities is the same as membership in the community, individuals are not free to join or leave the group at will. Since they reflect the social hierarchy of the community, they tend to be less egalitarian than other confraternities. Individuals automatically join such groups upon reaching a certain age or status in life. This type tends to be hostile to outside influences such as the adventitious deity and is the most affirmative of the local status quo of all confraternal groups. Type III, having three sub-types, is more complicated. Some of these groups (III-A) set up no requirements for membership except membership in the larger community. Examples are 1) recreation or travel associations which are the most open to voluntary participation, and 2) financial groups (mujin-kō or tanomoshi-kō) which are more gemeinschäftlich and tend to be obligatory. Occupational groups (III-B) which have fixed requirements for membership are relatively closed and involuntary. Type III-C includes subsections of the community which attempt to perpetuate privilege (cf. the kabuza above) or defend themselves against dist crimination. New immigrants to a village might form a confraternity of the latter sort. Type III groups may therefore, depending on the circumstances, exert either a centrifugal or a centripetal influence upon the ambient community.[77]

From this typology it is obvious that while they are often indiscriminantly treated as voluntary common-interest associations, there is considerable latitude in the nature of participation in these groups. Membership in some is voluntary and open, while in others it is involuntary and closed. As with the Christian sect, an affiliation which is voluntary in the first generation may become obligatory in the second. What nearly all have in common are the followinga

1. Whether they are coextensive with, smaller or greater than the local community, nearly all confraternities can be defined in terms of their relationships with a specific territorial society.
2. Most are marked by a cooperative, gemeinschäftlich spirit. For this reason the institution easily falls prey to the competitiveness of the modern age.
3. As common-interest associations, whether their aim is a common religious faith or a sweepstakes (mujin-kō), most are quite "rational" (in the Weberian sense of Zweckrationalität.) One of their functions is to restrict and regulate cooperation in the village.
4. Each member-household makes a direct contribution to the group.
5. While not all are leaders, all members enjoy more or less equal rights in the group.[78]

H. Kō and Miyaza

There are interesting parallels between these confraternities and the miyaza, both of which evolved within the encompassing framework of the medieval manor. Both had historical relations with the warrior class. Some kō which we now think of as peasant organizations, such as the Ise-kō of the Tokugawa period, were actually founded by warrior-cultivator families in the middle ages. Both institutions seem to have arisen first in the Capital Provinces, spreading to other areas of the country during the Late Medieval Period. Both therefore developed in areas where the economy was relatively advanced.[79] Both the miyaza and the kō were characterized by rotating offices, the miyaza generally changing officers on a yearly basis; while those in the kō often changed every month. Both functioned as good-luck institutions in their villages, their members distributing amulets; the miyaza at New Year's, the kō after members returned from a pilgrimage. I have already pointed out that during the late Tokugawa period parish guilds (especially the muraza) became synonymous with the parish (ujiko) itself. Likewise, in areas where membership in the confraternity was identical with membership in the community (Ikeda's Type II), the village meeting (yoriai) actually became synonymous with a meeting of the kō (kōyoriai).[80] These similarities do not, of course, disguise the fact that the two groups were organized along radically different lines. While the cultic life of the parish guild focused upon the tutelary deity of the village, many confraternities developed in

response to a source of sacrality lying outside the community. While residence, lineage and occupation played important roles in the infrastructure of many confraternities, the emphasis on faith in a specific, functional adventitious deity set them apart from the territorial parish and its guilds. The miyaza, especially in earlier timesą was organized according to strictly hierarchical principles so that it became the focal point of the tensions between the ujibito and ujiko, samurai and farmers, old and new families, patrons and clients, the rich and the poor. The confraternity (with the exception of Ikeda's Type II) was a comparatively egalitarian organization.[81]

V. The Modern Period

In the early decades of the Modern Period many of the religious institutions of Late Medieval times remained intact. Even under the influence of Meiji nationalism, the Shinto parish remained a focal point of the particularistic loyalties of the local community. The very taboos and abstinences of one village served to set it off from its neighborsą In one parish it was forbidden to raise black horses, while in the next the ujigami forbade his parishioners to eat eggs, noodles, or cucumbers. The "jealousy" of this deity was proverbial. He especially disliked seeing the number of his ujiko decrease. Equally distasteful--and forbidden--was casual participation in his cult by outsiders. Although they were more inclusive than the earlier monopolistic cliques, participation in these

liturgical communities was still carefully controlled. The territorial nature of the Late Medieval parish was especially important to the village, whose border itself "was the entrance to the outside world, a world ruled by different gods and possessing a different language, time system, and moral code."[82] Brides from other villages became members of the ujiko only after they had lived in the village for a year or twoa Before an adopted son-in-law (mukoyōshi) who was to carry on the family name could enter his wifeás home, he might be expected to carry a palanquin in the festival of the local Shinto shrine. Other adults who moved into the parish were usually admitted to the local cult after making a ritualistic "first visit" to the shrine and paying a fee. This was usually delayed for a year or two after a familyás arrival. In some cases, outsiders were never accepted as true ujiko. In some villages when a person could not return to his hometown for the New Yearás celebration a clod of earth from the precincts of the ujigami's shrine was mailed to him. This, again, is an indication of the territorial and particularistic nature of Shinto affiliations.

A. The Delocalization of Territorial Religious Institutions

In modern times many things conspired to weaken these territorial bonds. The government's policy of shrine mergers had the effect of uprooting religious affiliations which had evolved naturally over the centuries. Military conscription made it impossible for village youths to observe the religious

taboos of their natal ujigami. Above all, it was population mobility itself which did the greatest damage to these religious institutions. Farmers began to take up by-employments which, taking them away from their villages for a good part of the week, eroded the solidarity of the local community. While urbanization itself may not have produced modernity,[83] the institutions which grew up in the city combined with the disruptive influences of demographic change unquestionably weakened the gemeinschäftlich ties of the village. These changes also hastened the formation of nuclear families and the consequent division of generations, the children moving to the cities while their parents and grandparents remained at home in the village. With the young people gone, there was often a shortage of manpower in the villages for observing Shinto festivals.[84] Some villages had to hire outsiders to help them carry out these celebrations. In one village I visited in Wakayama Prefecture, there were so few young people left that trucks had to be used to carry the sacred palanquins in the festival parade.

While village headmen often serve as priests, the special religious rights and duties which other families had traditionally enjoyed began to break down in the Modern Period. Shrine-maidens who formerly were expected to be virgins of such-and-such an age and lineage nowadays are selected from among students who have no special connection with the parish. They regard their work for the shrine as a part-time job (arubaito).[85] Shinto priests now accept and even solicit dona-

tions from strangers. Since offerings to a shrine had always been a token of religious participation, this too is symptomatic of the breakdown of the territorial integrity of the parish. While it was not uncommon for a family to belong to more than one shrine in the pre-modern period, this usually happened only when the local parish was included in the domain of a larger one. In recent times, however, overlapping parish affiliations (chōfuku ujiko) have become a common phenomenon. Children of the same parents often belong to different Shinto parishes. Yanagita, for example, tells us that although his family resided in Tokyo for some fifty years, because they were constantly moving, he and his siblings belonged to several different ujiko in the city.[86] The sub-urbanization of the postwar years had an eroding impact on religious affiliations similar to the process of urbanization itself. Morioka Kiyomi in his study of Nozaki found a high correlation between a sense of parish membership and the length of a family's residence in this suburb of Tokyo. Conversely, because of the territorial nature of the Shinto parish (and the particularism of all Japanese groups) families moving into the suburbs do not feel much attachment to their new ujigami.[87] Even Japanese Christians complain how difficult it is for them--sociallyt-to move from one parish to another. Such demographic changes did nothing, of course, to enhance the solidarity of kin or parish. On the contrary, they resulted in a much weaker sense of affiliation with religious institutions and encouraged the growth of the more

transient religious style of individuals whom I shall call "clients."

B. Changes in Buddhist Institutions

Urbanization also had a detrimental effect upon Buddhist institutions. In many families which had moved to the city--and where no deaths had occurred in recent years--the name and location of the family's temple were often forgotten. If the older generation was left behind when the young people moved to the city, there might be no one in the new urban households to carry on the ancestral cult or instruct the younger generation in its piety. Today, places like Nagoya which are keen on city planning are setting up cemeteries in the suburbs. Separated geographically from the family temple, these cemeteries resemble large American-style non-denominational "memorial parks." Since people will no longer have reason to pay a call on the Buddhist priest when they visit their family graves, these cemeteries will be likely to weaken still further their religious affiliations.[88] Even in the Tokugawa period a number of contemporary observers complained that confraternities had degenerated into occasions for feasting and gossip alone."[89] In modern Japan these groups have continued to decline. Many were discontinued and were never again revived after the men of the community were conscripted in the last war. Others were taken over by women in the men's absence and have remained in their hands ever since. Many nembutsu-kō which meet once a month to recite sutras or sing hymns actually function as senior citizens' clubs. Perhaps

the most important reason for the decline of these associations is that the secular role they once played as cooperative groups in their communities is no longer needed in modern Japanese societya After the Meiji period participation in many common interest associations which had previously been obligatory became voluntary.[90] Such voluntary groups, especially when based on "faith alone,á' are notoriously difficult to maintain in Japan.

In the Modern Period new types of religious affiliation began to supplement, threaten and replace those of the Late Medieval Period. Here I shall mention only some of the most important.

C. Civil Religion

During the decades of hyperventilated nationalization which preceeded the Pacific War, being Japanese was itself a kind of religious affiliation. One of the majær problems for the new Meiji government was how to generate a truly national spirit that would be strong enough to rechannel the particularistic loyalties symbolized by the local ujigamia The government was also concerned to prevent the growth of class consciousness in villages which were being exploited by landlords, industry and government alike. The aim of the government's ideological program during these turbulent years was the creation of a patriotic but depoliticized village symbolized by the so-called "imperial farmer.á' After the effects of the world depression of 1929 began to be felt in Japan, many of the urban unemployed

sought to return to their families in the countryside. Often they found the way barred by the elders of the village who claimed that the village was too poor or its land too scarce to support the urban refugeest They feared that city ways might corrupt village morals.[91] For this reason, many of the uprooted were unable to return to the village Gemeinschaft which had been the traditional solice of the Japanese folk. Instead, at every turn--in factories, schools, and on the street--they were treated to the Sirens' song of the family-state. Officially at least, the nation came to regard itself as one extended family or village. Since both family and village had been in some sense religious corporations, the sacred nature of the emerging family-state was obvious.

The "immanental theocracy"[92] which the government concocted in order to achieve these ends was as artificial and contrived as the mythology of the Kojiki itselft While the imperial family had existed for well over a millenium, the imperials system which now emerged as an ideological technique for controlling the entire populace was something rather new. Mass media were employed to spread among commoners the archaic imperial mythology which in the past had been the serious make-believe of aristocratic and military circles alone.

After 1887 when Japan failed to win a revision of her "unequal treaties" with western powers, a host of religio-political societies began to spring up throughout the land until, by 1936, they numbered nearly 750. By seeking to reassert the spiritual unity of the nation in the face of the double threat

of western imperialism and internal disintegration, these groups mediated between traditional religious and political outlooks and the emerging state cult. Since nearly all religious and political bodies contributed to the generation of the symbols and slogans of the new ideology, clearly more was involved in prewar Japanese patriotism than "State Shinto" or "Shinto Nationalism."[93] Too complicated to be identified with Shinto alone, the halo of symbols and slogans and emotions which congealed around Japan in those years would better be denoted by some more general term such as "civil religion."[94] The pivotal symbols in this religion were the sacred ancestors of the imperial family. By homologizing these deities (i.e. the lineage ideology of ancient Japan) with the ancestor worship of the common people, the government thought to create a feeling of national unity and dedication. The machinations of Japan's new industrial and military leaders which caused such suffering and deprivations among the rural masses, were now beautified as the "wish" of the imperial ancestors.

> Before 1945--and to a considerable extent even afterwards --ancestors were a primary religious symbol of conscience.[95] To honor them was the mark of a solid character. To dishonor them, was to act without scruples--and to court misfortune. By grafting their schemes into this ingenuous religious and moral faith--i.e. by manipulating guilt-government ideologists sought to sublimate and raise the loyalties of families to the level of a new national consciousness. An excellent example of the psychological effectiveness of this manipulation can be

seen in a novel by Murayama Tomoyoshi, a writer active in the proletarian art movement. Arrested in 1932, he underwent tenkō (ideological conversion to the imperial ideology) and for two years after his release from prison devoted himself to writing "conversion novels." In his book Byakuya (The White Night), he describes the psychology of tenkō. The following passage is a vivid illustration of the role of ancestors as symbols and agents of conscience.

> After his second summer there (in prison), absolutely shut away from fresh air, his mind was eroded by something undefined and invincible. He felt as though his flesh and blood, or rather something mysteriously a part of his own father and mother, and of their forebearers from time immemorial, whose faces, names and lives had long since perished was eating away his existence, which was after all an infinitesimally small particle of their posterity. However hard he tried to cry out at them, to push them aside, and to drive them out, it was of no avail. In his struggle with his invisible foes, day in and night out, he groaned, struck his head with his fists, and scratched the wall with nails."[96]

The official consciousness--and conscience--propagated by the government resonated with other aspects of the folk tradition as well. Maruyama Masao went as far as to suggest that the village itself was the very prototype of the National Essence (kokutai) being fabricated by the government.

> The village Gemeinschaft is based on dōzoku (including fictitious) ties, common religious rituals, and the "old custom of neighborhood cooperation." Without allowing the individual his autonomy, it is an emotional, face-to-face unity which avoids any honest confrontation of interests or the clarifications of the real basis for decision-making. It is the fountainhead of Japan's "indigenous faith" and a true unity of authority (seen especially in its control over the rights to common lands and water) and affection (political and economic "parent-child" relations). For

> these reasons, the village Gemeinschaft is a "model" for traditional human relatäons and makes up the smallest "cell" of the National Essence (kokutai).[97]

This position has been questioned in recent years, especially by Irokawa Daikichi. According to Irokawa, the village Gemeinschaft "served as the base from which the people could organize against and resist outside authoritiesa If the West hadn't arrived on the scene during the latter part of the nineteenth century, the kyōdotai would have been the basis of Japan's indigenous development and it would have brought forward a grass-roots form of democratic development.a'[98] It is, in fact, unquestionable that many of the government's ideological projects were non-resonating, or even dissonant vis-a-vis the folk tradition. Some policies such as the shrine consolidation program produced social cacaphony and had to be dropped. Some concepts--such as kokutai, chūkō ippon (the unity of loyalty and filial piety) and kazokushugi (familyism) resonated at such weird and unfamiliar frequencies that school children assimilated them only gradually if at all. Another dissonant item in the new national cult was the creation of imperial festivals celebrated according to the solar calendar. This series of festivals was widely ignored in the villages, except in the village schools.a'[99]

In spite of these points of friction, the village and the family undeniably contributed to the stock of controlling symbols and values of the civil religion. Thousands of villages in which headmen doubled as Shinto priests were virtually microcosms of the "unity of religion and government" which the government was seeking to promote at the national level. Like-

wise, the kinship systems of many parts of Japan (but not all) also seemed to be a reflection of the paternalism of the family-state. What is more, as we shall see later[100] there was hardly any alternative to the ethos of these primary institutions in Japan. Dore and Ōuchi have therefore not exaggerated their point when they claim that the village spirit was a "facilitating condition" leading to the rise of fascism in Japan."[101]

In the history of religious affiliations which we have been tracing, the prewar civil religion marked the highpoint of public participation. The nation itself was enfranchised--and mobilized--as the holy community. Like the ancestral uji-gami faith upon which it was built, the civil religion promoted intimate and irrational feelings of dependence and loyalty, collectivistic emotions, and an uncritical ethos of obedience."[102] Nearly all religious and political groups except Protestant Christianity and the Communist Party became imbued by its "false consciousness." As a submerged ideology, not a few of its values and symbols continue to influence the Japanese self-image in the postwar period. This can be seen not only in the New Religions but in the spate of books and articles dealing with the "essence" of Japanese culture (Nihon bunka ron) in recent years.

It could be argued that the spiritual successor of the family-state in the postwar period is the Japanese company. Many of these companies try to generate a spirit of comradeship, not unlike that of a religious, or moral, community. Employees are sent for weekend retreats in Zen temples, or are given

other forms of spiritual education (seishin kyōiku) at company expense. The workday itself often begins with calisthenics and the singing of the company song (shakun)n These songs seem to be contemporary versions of the principles (kakun) of family enterprises in the premodern period. To Western ears, most of these ditties are moralistic and maudlin in the extreme. I once walked into a fashionable tea shop next to Tokyo's Meguro Station just before business began. Standing in a circle around the manager, I overheard eight young people chanting in unison"

> We are grateful to the people of the world!
>
> We will not forget that our shop has been set up for the sake of the customer!
>
> Sharing both happiness and sorrow, we will cooperate and not forget to encourage each other!
>
> Setting aside the past and the anxiety of the morrow we will not forget to give our all for the work before us today!

The twenty odd shakun I have collected and studied since that day consistently celebrate the same values: harmony, cooperation, integrity and an unflagging devotion to the cause. Judging from the words of these songs, the purpose of the firm is not material gain but "service" to the nation, and indeed, to the world. No deity could be adulated more than the steel company praised in its official song as "the camellia and rainbow of our hopes," "the unity of love and harmony," "the glory of history," "the fresh breath of dawn," "the flower of sincerity," "our pride," and "our prayer."

D. The Devotee and the "Marketing" of New Religions

Of the religious affiliations one associates with modern Japan, the New Religions are without doubt the best known. Like the territorial Shinto parish, family temple, Pure Land confraternity, and the miyaza, the great majority of these New Religions, starting with Tenrikyō, Kurozumikyō and Konkōkyō in the nineteenth century, first emerged in the parts of the country which were undergoing most rapid economic change.[103] The spread of these religions in the nineteenth century may therefore be regarded as a symptom of the breakdown of the traditional village Gemeinschaft. As so often happened in the past, the deterioration of the cohesiveness of the local community lowered its resistance to infiltration by adventitious deities. The most spectacular period in the development of these New Religions was the postwar period. This can be traced to the humiliation of losing the war and to the anxiety which grew out of the radical demographic dislocations of these years. In 1950, 70% of the Japanese people still lived in the countryside. This figure includes those who had fled from the cities where their homes had been destroyed during the last months of the war. By 1963, the ratio of urban to rural populations had been reversed, with 70% now living in the cities. This tremendous dislocation of the population caused considerable emotional stress, especially among those classes not under the protection of powerful industrial patrons or labor unions.[104] It was people of this sort--and not merely the Lumpenproletariat--who had the greatest elective affinity for the New Religions during the time of their

phenomenal growth from 1950 to 1965.

Affiliations with the New Religions were both different from and similar to those of pre-modern religious institutions. Like groups in the traditional village, the New Religions made use of fictive parent-child relations at all levels. The group meetings (hōza and zadankai) of some of these religions resembled the more egalitarian of the pre-modern confraternities. In fact, Ikeda Yoshisuke sees the New Religions as institutions growing out of his Type I confraternity--i.e., a supra-local association based on a commonly shared religious faith. The New Religions, especially before the war, shared many of the organizational strengths and weaknesses of the traditional kō. The missionary of the New Religion approached the village as a stranger, as a messenger of an adventitious deity. Typically, a congregation collected around him, grew for a while, and then became an established feature of the community. Soon it reached its maximum growth and became static. The particularistic loyalties within both the community and the local congregation often proved stronger than ties with the sect's headquarters. After the war, however, the more enterprising of these religions developed a new "market approach"--the "Coca-Cola method" as Ikado Fujio puts it--which was more successful when dealing with a mobile population of religious consumers. Ikado points out that the organization of these institutions "is very similar to, or even more rationalized than economic and political ones."[105]

Most of the devotees of these New Religions initially join not out of any profound interest in religion but for reasons

of health or "interest" in the extraordinary world of spirits and miracles. In a survey I conducted in 1976 among 688 members of of Sekai Mahikari Bunmei Kyōdan, an exorcástic cult founded by Okada Kōtama in 1959, the following reasons were given for joining the sect (a number of individuals gave more than one reason for joining).

MOTIVE	PERCENTAGE
Sickness.	46.7
Economic anxiety. . . . a	3.3
Family problems . . .a.	7.8
Problems with people outside the family.	3.5
Marital problems. . . . a	1.3
Interest in miracles. . . a . a .	19.6
Interest in religion. . a	9.6
Interest in spirits	16.6
Anxiety over the breakdown of society (politics, pollution, etc.).	4.9
No answer . . a	10.2

This survey shows that in the comparatively prosperous 1970s, financial worries were negligible as a factor for joining the sect. The high level of interest in spirits (1.7 times as high as interest in religion <u>per se</u>) is due largely to the folk belief emphasized by the sect that illness and other misfortunes are caused by evil spirits. Thus those who join the sect because they are interested in spirits are closely related to those who join expecting a miracle or because of ill health. The great majority join the sect hoping to receive some practical benefit from their affiliation.

Equally revealing are the ways in which people find out about the group. The following responses were given:

INFLUENCE	PERCENTAGE
Newspapers and advertising.	22.5
Lectures and testimonial meetings .	6.1
Recommended by a person in the same line of work . . . a	1.5
Recommended by a person in the same place of work.	5.2
Recommended by a superior . . . a .	6.4
Recommended by a relative	37.5
Recommended by a friend . . . . a .	20.8
Recommended by a stranger	5.7
No answer	3.2

Here we see that the most important single factor in propagating the sect is kinshipa-one of the linchpins of religious affiliations throughout Japanese historya If we assume that among the friends who recommended the sect a large number are neighbors, it seems that Blut und Boden continue to be the most important influences in the recruiting of these groups. If this is soa it would seem that the New Religions are spread not just by systematic marketing techniques but through the personal influences of kith and kin. In other words, these affiliations are established not by a customer making a rational selection among alternative products in the "supermarket" of sects and deities. On the contrary, the (potential) customer stays at home and knows little or nothing about these religious alternatives until a friend or relative drops by with the Good News about messiah A, sect B, and miracles C, D, E.... This kind of recruiting is therefore closer to a call by the Avon lady (in Japana Pola) than to Berger and Luckmann's "supermarket model" of religious propagation.[106]

E. The Clientt Transient, Ad Hock Religious Affiliations

Compared with the behavior of these devotees, little is known about the behavior of religious "clients"--people who establish only transient, ad hoc relations with temples, shrines, fortune-tellers and healers. These are people who, for example, at New Year's, flood temples and shrines throughout Japan and put up traditional decorations at home, but feel no particular or enduring sense of loyalty to any specific parish, family temple, sect or cult. Typologically speaking, the client might be thought of as a somewhat secularized and erratic pilgrim. When he attends a religious festival, he plays the role of a guest--unlike an active member of the parish whose role is that of the devoted and conscientious host.t[107] Since he is bound to shrines or temples neither by kinship nor by neighborhood ties, the tired questions about rights, duties and privileges which so preoccupied the members of religious cliques and parishes are naturally of little concern to him. Like the devotee of the New Religions, the object of his devotion is usually a deity with a specific religio-magical boon to offer. For example, a young woman in Japan often consults mediums about her marriage prospects. She might even buy amulets that will help her find a husband. Let us suppose this amulet works. Her next trip to a shrine might be to purchase another amulet for safe childbirth. Later, when her husband buys a new Datsun, he might take it to Narita Fudōsan to have it blessed by the magic of the Shingon sect of Buddhism. When their son becomes a high school senior, he might take a trip to the shrine of Tenjin

(Sugawara Michizane) to pray for good luck on his college entrance examinations. All of these religious activities are specific, goal-oriented, ad hoc, this-worldly, and not necessarily repeated. The growth of these floating (and fleeting) client-type relations seems closely related to the general atomization of modern Japanese cities. The phenomenon is also a response to the expansion of professional Shinto priesthoods which have tended to encourage the commercialism of festivals and have made possible the sale of amulets and blessings in the shrine throughout the whole week.[108]

The appearance of the client on such a large scale is obviously part of the privitization of religion in modern society. While many of the client's activities are therefore performed as an individual, he also acts as a member of a group on various occasions. This group, however, is not permanently tied to the object of devotion. One of the best illustrations of this, and of the client's activities in general, is the recent, and somewhat macabre, boom in Sudden Death Temples (pokkuri-dera). The "specialty" of these temples is to ensure the client of a quick and easy death. The Sudden Death Temples have become quite popular since about 1960 among the aged, a minority group which feels particularly threatened and discriminated against in modern Japan. In 1974, 9.6% of Japan's population was over 65 years of age. As the size of the average family decreased,[109] more and more of the elderly began to live apart from their children. Presently about 26% of them maintain a separate residence--few compared with Western countries, but a

great increase when compared with prewar Japan. This is a population cohort which came to age when great stress was laid on the family and on respecting one's elders. The preference of the younger generation for maintaining separate homes naturally seems selfish to them. Spending their final years of life in a culture whose byword is "throw away after using" (tsukai sutete bunka), the elderly feel that they too have been used and cast aside. Because postwar legislation encourages the equal distribution of inheritances, in many families no one child has the material resources to take care of his parents. Many of these old people are therefore passed around from one child to the next (tarai-mawashi or babakorogashi as it is called)a-which for the elderly is an exhausting and unsettling routine. According to statistics submitted to the World Health Organization in 1974, there were on the average 18 suicides by elderly Japanese every day. This is two more per day than in 1971 when Japan already had the world's second highest rate of elderly suicidesa[110] Under these circumstances it is little wonder that the aged turn to Amida Buddha and pray for a quick end to the sorrows of this life.

Tours to the Sudden Death Temples are organized by Buddhist Ladies Associations, senior citizens clubs and travel agents. Only a few clients come by themselves. The tours include stops at two or three such temples and an overnight stay in a temple inn. At the Kichidenji temple in Nara,[111] a complete pilgrimage consists of three separate visitationsa the first to pray for long life and good health; the second for

protection against accidents; and the third for a quick and easy death (anraku ōjō)e Because old people often fear the embarassing diseases of the lower parts (shimo no byō)e they are asked to bring a special set of underwear with them to be blessed. Those who forget to bring underwear with them may purchase it at the temple itself. These garments are blessed by the priest who sprinkles them with holy water and utters a spell over them in the name of a toilet deity called Uzumasa. After this the priest gives a fifteen-minute sermonette in which he mixes comic entertainment with some of the sobering thoughts of traditional Buddhisme He assures his audience that death is not something to be fearede but is merely the falling of autumn leaves. With simple daily effort, one can be reborn in the Pure Land. We should therefore, smile, use gentle words, and keep our hearts pure.

As a mode of religious affiliation, the Sudden Death Tour (pokkuri tsuā) is obviously ad hoc and transient. No one gets to know the priest or his family, nor does the priest have time to talk personally with the thousands of people to whom he ministers each week. The relationship is, in fact, contractual: the underwear is blessed for a set fee (2000 yen in 1976). Looked at as a total event, only part of the "therapy" of the tour takes place in the temple itself. Back in their comfortable excursion buses, the old people have a chance to talk with each other about their health, differences with their children, and other problems of aging. The religious activities of modern

clients such as these pokkuri pilgrims therefore fulfill needs equally as specific, and serious, as those dealt with by the New Religions.[112]

VI. Modernity and ReligioustAffiliations

From de Coulanges, Durkheim, Weber, Parsons, Jaspers and Bellah, scholars who have helped set the comparative framework of this study, we have learned that the modernization of western society rests upon a chain of interrelated, epochal disjunctions. We are told that the transition from traditional civilization to modernity was made possible by crucial differentiations which took place in the West throughout a long history beginning in ancient Israel, Greece and Rome, viz., the separation of the Creator God from His creation (religious transcendence), the separation of the religious community from ethnic and political groups (voluntarism), and the separation of individuals from their "ascriptive embeddedness" in primary groups (individualism). Furthermore, it has been argued that our western traditions of ethical universalism, law and dialectical thought rest upon the same cultural, indeed religious, fissions. The obverse side of these dissociations has been of equal importance, i.e. the epochal enfranchisements which, having overcome the political and sacerdotal monopolies of the past, resulted in the tolerant denominationalism, ecumenism and pluralism of the modern age.

It would be the height of cultural provincialism to insist that all of these disjunctions be present before a society

is called modern.a[113] In fact, to insist that all of the essential ingredients of Western cultural history are necessary for the emergence of modernity "in the true sense of the word" would be to commit the simple, but gross, logical error of post hoc ergo propter hoc. There are obviously many roads to modernity, many "modernizations" as it were.

As we conclude this study of religious affiliations in Japan, we must return to the idea that the development of these affiliations can be used, in some sense, as an index of social change. What does the study of religious affiliations in Japan have to teach us about the modernization of Japanese society?

A. Religious Enfranchisement or Demonopolization

In Japan what resembles the evolution of western society most closely is the gradual extension of a religious and political franchise which we have seen taking place throughout the history of the country: the liberation of lower classes from the constraints of monopolistic cliques and the ideology of lineage, the development of voluntaristic confraternities based on faith, the expanding enclosures which gradually enfranchised not merely entire villages but the nation itself, the rise of individual patterns of religious affiliation in the modern period and, finally, the guarantee of religious freedom after the war. The zealous "whosoever-will-may-come" spirit of the New Religions seems to be a counterpart to the voluntarism of Western religion. Personal relationships within these New Religionsa-and the new Japan of which they are a part--also

seem to be less rigidly particularistic than in the past. This trend towards ethical universalism is particularly evident in public school education.[114]

B. Religious Affiliations, Pluralism and Modernity

In the West, one usually associates such processes of enfranchisement with the growth of tolerant, heterogeneous mass-societies. Berger and Luckmann contend that pluralism itself "is the consequence of a historical process of demonopolization."[115] Does this generalization apply to Japan? In spite of the prima facie similarities in the demonopolization of religious affiliations, when one considers their concomitant levels of cultural integration, the differences between Japanese and Western societies seem to be of greater significance. Demonopolization by itself does not seem capable of transforming "the sacred canopy" of the past into the cultural toadstools of a pluralistic society.

While semi-autonomous villages played a crucial role in Japanese history in the Late Medieval Period, the city--the cradle of western pluralism--is a comparatively recent development. By the beginning of the Tokugawa period the only cities worth mentioning in Japan were Kyoto, Osaka, Sakai, Fushimi and Edo. Kamishima Jirō points out that while the Japanese city had its own distinctive ethos it did not develop into a genuine alternative to the way of life of the village. In the Meiji period, schools and company dormitories often housed young people from the same village, bringing to the city the village

spirit *en bloc*. People from the same province also gravitated towards each other. Tokyo, the Japanese city par excellence, was a place with few traditions or taboos of its own which could limit change or impair rapid modernization. Thus, the kind of transformation from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* alleged to characterize the history of western cities has not been as obvious in Japan. On the contrary, Kamishima argues the folk religion, gerontocracy, familyism, hierarchy and self-sufficiency which characterized the traditional village are the marks of the Japanese city itself. The city is therefore, as he puts it, merely a "second village."[116] Tsurumi Kazuko reinforces this opinion when she writes: "On the surface . . . contemporary Japanese society looks like a model mass society. At bottom, however, the primary village community and the fictitious village within the city are still preserved."[117]

Needless to say, such non-urbane cities limited the growth of pluralism in Japan. And yet the westerner will insist that "modern community must be pluralistic."[118] In the West, we expect a modern society to embrace a multiplicity of autonomous interests and orientations. In societies which are, at once, democratic, capitalist, *and* modern we expect these (often antagonistic) elements to confront one another freely in parliaments, the media, as well as in the market place. Writing in this vein, David E. Apter holds that "to be modern means to see life as alternatives, preferences, and choices. . . . Therefore, debate and discussion are characteristics of modernity. In fact, to my mind, they are the critical and

minimal conditions of modernity."[119]

In Japan where the concept of the "public" (ōyake) until modern times meant merely having a relationship with the court, and where public speech was unknown until Fukuzawa Yukichi introduced it in the Meiji period, public debate and discussion are recent phenomena. It is no wonder, then, that in classical Japanese literature the orator, who plays such a large role in the literature of the West, is replaced by the diarist.[120] The concept of public morality, or a morality transcending the particularistic obligations of family and village, was introduced only after the creation of public space--railroads, highways, parks, etc.--in the Meiji period. As Edward Norbeck points out, "the idea of 'public morality' may be seen as an attempt to formulate conventions suitable to the enlarged social world of modern times."[121] Without public space and public speech, the discussion of radical social and cultural alternatives has been limited. As early as about 700 A.D., the poet Kakinomotono-Hitomaro had pointed out "in our land covered with reed and rice-ears, they have not argued since the time of the gods." Even before this the so-called Seventeen Article Constitution had made harmony, concord, and decorum the first principles of the state. This stress on harmony and consensus which has echoed and reechoed throughout Japanese history has clearly delayed the growth of a dialectical spirit. While debates did occur between rival Buddhist monks, Buddhist logic (immyō) itself became a kind of dialogical etiquette--which, "accompanied by a certain gracious rhythm,"[122] was transmitted

from master to disciple in secret. Logic was thereby transformed into ritual, ceremony and art. Debate may have been limited by the lack of any universally recognized law, scripture, or sense of religious transcendence (e.g. a Covenant) by which the right and wrong of things could be publicly adjudicated.

Granting that debate and the opportunity to stage debate in public space have been limited in Japan, what kinds of cultural, or religious "alternatives" have been available for "discussion"? The answer to this question at first seems obvious: for millenia the Japanese have enjoyed a plethora of religious alternatives. We have seen however that these alternatives usually have been absorbed by the more demanding obligations of primary groups, the village and the family. We have therefore treated these absorbed alternatives as examples of a "centripetal differentiation." As Hori Ichirō put it, "we find the same religious structures whether we look at the nation, the family, ancestors or human relations… while there is a kind of differentiation made between gods and men, the sacred and the secular, there is not the absolute distinction one finds in monotheism."[123] Religious alternatives in Japan have generally led in a direction antithetical to the pluralism ("centrifugal differentiation") which, in the West, one associates with modernity. Only in the Shinshū, Nichiren (e.g. Fuju-Fuse) sects and in Christianity have the Japanese found potential alternatives to the cultural mainstream built of sturdier stuff.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the New Religions

seem to have established affiliations of a more "modern" sort. In the West,tone commonly thinks of the "religious joiner" as an active, discerning, and choosing individual. We have seen that Berger and Luckmann envisage this individual strolling through the supermarket of suburban denominations, selectively (i.e. comparatively and rationally) making his purchases. We have discovered however that whatever its validity in the West, this supermarket model of religious recruitment is of limitedt value in Japan. While many individuals change from one New Religion totthe next,[124] few seem to select their religion on the basis of any cool, comparative study. The individual, and his family, often drop out when the sect fails to bring about the kind of health, wealth, and happiness it promised to deliver. New religious affiliations are then established in a personal, but often haphazard way. While advertising and other impersonal forms of evangelizing are important ways of recruiting, in some of the New Religions conversions are more often the result of the influence of relatives and friends. For these reasons, I have suggested that an "Avon or Pola model" of evangelization be used as a supplement to Ikado's "Coca-Cola method.t"[125] Once the individual becomes a member, his time, energy and concentration tend to be completely mobilized by the group. The religious and magical ideas and practices of these religions--animism, shamanism and ancestor-worship--are not only pre-modern; they can be traced back to the most archaic strata of Japanese religious history. The values they teach and exemplify are also those of pre-modern Japan: harmony, coopera-

tion, selflessness, thankfulness, and a fastidious sense of obligation and hierarchy. The themes of non-dualism, the unity of man, god and nature, the oneness of the emperor and his people, and the special mission of the Japanese race taught, mutatis mutandis, by most of these religions are clear survivals of the civil religious sentiments of the prewar period. Such ideas are compatible with democracy only when one identifies democracy--as the Japanese tend to do-- with a political and spiritual consensus. Thus the New Religions give greater scope to the activities of individuals without in any way fostering individualism. While there are hundreds of such religious groups to choose from, the particularistic loyalties they generate result merely in a pluralism of memberships and external doctrines. The growth of any deeply rooted pluralism in thought, feeling or values is quickly stifled by a dominant internal ethos redolent of the gross national custom of Japan before 1945.[126]

Movements such as the New Religions which worship universal (or even monotheistic deities) have tended to develop more open or voluntaristic patterns of affiliation. Nevertheless, salvation religions--such as Amidism, which transcend not only the village but Japan itself--have generally been domesticated by the needs of ancestor worship. They have also been transformed into less than ultimate concerns by the interests of the local communities which absorbed the confraternities and sects bearing the Good News. We have also seen how these movements

were coopted and subdued by the government itself. The solidarity between religious affiliations and primary institutions which reslted from all of this may have helped to delay any radical differentiation between social reality and cultural ideals. The kind of "axial breakthrough" witnessed in other civilizations therefore seems to have been repeatedly postponed in Japan.[127] Needless to say, the government itself played a major role in maintaining this state of affairs. In the chauvanistic atmosphere of prewar Japan, official government scholars such as Inoue Tetsujirō could seriously maintain that Japan had fulfilled the Hegelian dream — the Real had become the Ideal, the Ideal the Real.[128] Japan's "immanental theocracy" was therefore erected upon a belabored identification of the sacred and the social. Actually, the government's ideal of the unity of religion and government (saisei-itchi) was a scheme to "dedifferentiate" a society that was becoming increasingly complex — and critical — Nevertheless, the official civil theology resonated deeply with the kind of saisei-itchi that we have discovered in the micropolitics of the Japanese village — Civil theology, poured our "from above" and fermented in the religious and political vessels of folk custom, produced the heady brew of prewar civil religion. This climate of opinion quite naturally included important elements of religious nativism (kokugaku) and anti-modernism (kindai no chōkoku) which, like romantic nationalism and radical socialism in the West, aimed at "a more tightly integrated, a less differentiated, and less individualistic society."[129] The demonopolization

of religious affiliations finally turned out to be a symptom of mass mobilization rather than an index of growing pluralism. The cost of this cultural atavism both in war and human exploitation is too well known to be recounted.

The kinds of disjunctions which allegedly have characterized the rise of the modern West--religious transcendence, individualism, a dialectical spirit, the concept of the public, and even pluralism itself--must be treated as secondary characteristics of the modernization process. As such they color and shape, but do not determine the level or degree of modernity. There are, after all, as many ways for a society to be modern as there are for it to be traditional. We have seen in this paper that in their religious life, the Japanese have freed themselves from the fetters of tribe, clique and local community to a remarkable degree. Yet, these fetters have often been reforged as the rivets of human relations in an industrial societyt In the West, liberation from "the constraining conditions of tribe, ethnic affiliation, particularistic privileges, and the mediation of religious organizationst"[130] has been called by some secularization, by others modernization, and by still others--looking at things from an entirely different perspective--salvation-history. What one calls the similar, if not so radical, movements in Japanese history depends on how one reads history, and on what the Japanese themselves do with the possibilities that history discloses.

FOOTNOTES

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1. While this paper rests upon theoretical concepts taken from Western sociology, the threefold typology which I shall develop is similar to those suggested by a number of Japanese scholars. Hagiwara Tatsuo in "Kinsei saishidan seiritsu josetsu," Nihon bunka kenkyūjo kiyō (Kokugakuin Daigaku), 1959, No. 4, pp. 22-26 puts forward a scheme which, beginning with the ujibito or clansmen (roughly the ancient period), goes through a (medieval) miyaza stage, and culminates in the (modern) ujiko. Closer to my own typology (because they go beyond the ujiko) are the suggestions of Wakamori Taro, Morioka Kiyomi, and Chiba Masaji. Wakamori divides religious affiliations in Japan into those based on kinship (ancient), territory (feudal), and faith (modern). (See "Shinkō shūdan," Nihon minzokugaku taikei, Vol. III, Shakai to minzoku. Tokyo: Tōkyō Heibonsha, 1962, pp. 259-288.) Morioka in Religion in Changing Japanese Society (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1975, p. 71) points out that the Shinto shrines "first came into existence to enshrine the guardian deity of a clan (ichimon no ujigami) and that subsequently, with the collapse of the clan system and the participation of people who had been outsiders, the guardian deity became the tutelary deity of an area. . . . At the present time, however, due to the urbanization of society, the guardian deities of local areas are in the process of becoming delocalized and their shrines too are drawing worshipers from increasingly extensive areas." My own research also would support Chiba's tripartition: miyaza, ujiko and sūkeisha (the latter roughly corresponding to my "clients" and "devotees"). Chiba, however, hesitates to call this development "historical" since some regions such as Tōhoku have never had miyaza while others have preserved the institution to the present day. I have sought to avoid this impasse by defining my typological stages more broadly. See his Matsuri no hoshakaigaku. Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1970, p. 93. Others, such as Higo Kazuo, Harada Toshiaki, Ariga Kizaemon and Itō Mikiharu are even more strongly opposed to this developmental approach either because they confuse it with nineteenth century evolutionism or because they prefer the ahistorical approach of structural anthropology. See Itō Mikiharu, "'Ujiko' no shakaijinruigaku josetsu," Nihon bunka kenkyūjo kiyō, 1970, No. 25, pp. 1-29.

2. Even in the Ancient and Early Medieval Period religious affiliations based on lineage, territory and faith coexisted. For example, in the prestigious Twenty-Two Shrines which took final shape in the Kyoto-Nara area by the middle of the eleventh century there were clan deities (Kasuga, Yoshida), territorial shrines (Kamo, Inari, Gion), and shrines supported by clients (Iwashimizu, Kitano). Harada Toshiaki, Jinja: minzokugaku no tachiba kara miru. Tokyo: Shibundo, 1961, pp. 93-94. While these three types of affiliation continue to coexist to this day, one should not overlook the still more significant changes in their relative strengths and weaknesses in Japanese society.

3. Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City: A Study on the Religion, Laws, and Institutions of Greece and Rome. Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, no date, p. 394.

4. See Robert N. Bellah, "Durkheim and History," American Sociological Review (August 1959), Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 447-473.

5. Talcott Parsons, "Christianity and Modern Industrial Society," in Edward A. Tiryakian, ed., Sociological Theory, Values, and Socio-Cultural Change. New York and Evanston: Harper Torchbooks, 1967, ppt 33-70. I cite this work as an exemplary model of the method I shall use in this paper, not because I agree with his optimism about the institutionalization of Christian values. Robert N. Bellah has used a similar methodological approach in his study of the "evolutionary" development of world religion in Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, "Religious Evolution," pp. 20-50.

6. Talcott Parsons, "Religion in a Modern Pluralistic Society," Review of Religious Research (Spring, 1966), Vol. 7, No. 3, p. 132.

7. "Social Change, Differentiation, and Evolution," American Sociological Review (1964), Vol. XXIX, p. 376. For examples of this process see Neil J. Smelser, Social Change in the Industrial Revolution: An Application of Theory to the British Cotton Industry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, p. 1.

8. For a concrete, ethnographic description of the differentiation between society and culture see Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973, "Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example," pp. 142-169.

9. The Origin and Goal of History. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 2. For a number of excellent

studies dealing with several cultures from this point of view see Daedalus (Spring, 1975)t, "Wisdom, Revelation, and Doubt: Perspectives on the First Millenium B.C." t*passim*.

10. Reinhard Bendix, Embattled Reason: Essays on Social Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered,t' pp. 250-314.

11. See below, "Civil Religion,t' pp. 54-59.

12. De Coulanges, The Ancient City, p. 285.

13. Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966, p. 22.

14. "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective," Comparative Studies in Society and History (March 1973), Vol. 15, No. 2, p. 199.

15. Alicia Matsunaga, The Buddhist Philosophy of Assimilation: The Historical Development of the Honji-Suijaku Theory. Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle, 1969, pp. 166-171.

16. Mizuno Yū, Origins of the Japanese People. (Understanding Japant Bulletin of the International Society for Educational Information, Vol. XXII)t Tokyo: International Society for Educational Information, 1968; Joseph M. Kitagawa, "Prehistoric Background of Japanese Religion,t' History of Religions, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter, 1962), pp. 292-328.

17. Joseph M. Kitagawa, Religion in Japanese History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 19.

18. Harada Toshiaki, Jinja..., p. 14.

19. Hagiwara Tatsuo, Chūsei saishi soshiki no kenkyū. Tokyot Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1965, pp. 18-19.

20. Donald L. Philippi, trans. Kojiki. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1968, p. 41.

21. Kitagawa, Religion in Japanese History, p. 16.

22. Strictly speaking, Shinto has no "clergy" in the Christian sense, and therefore no "laymen.t' While sacraments were not used to control access to the sacred, monopolistic, and later professional, groups did make use of the priesthood in order to insure their own social status and power. For discussion of the ideal-typical development of shrine leadership see Wakamori Tarō, Chūsei kyōdōtai no kenkyū. Tokyot Kiyomizu Kōbundō Shoten, 1967, pp. 106-127.

23. See below, p. 46.

24. Marcel Mauss, A General Theory of Magic. New Yorkt W.t W. Norton and Co., 1972, p. 142.

25. Hori Ichirō, "Shokugyō no kami,t' Nihon minzokugaku taikei, Vol. 8, Shinkō to minzoku. Tokyot Heibonsha, 1962, pp. 91-135.

26. For a general description of the miyaza see Thomas C. Smith, The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959, pp. 188-200 and Winston Davis, "Parish Guilds and Political Culture in Village Japan,t' Journal of Asian Studies (November 1976)t, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, pp. 25-36.

27. A branch of the Bungo clan'ts Usa Hachiman shrine appeared in Nara in the second half of the eighth century and, after the capital was moved to Heian-kyō, branches were established in Yamashiro at Rikiyū Hachiman (Yamagaki) and Iwashimizu (Otokoyama). By the end of the ninth century, branches of the Munakata shrine in Kyūshū could be found in the capital. The Kasuga shrine of the Fujiwara in Nara had branches at the Ōharano and Yoshida shrines in Heian-kyō, at the Hiraoka shrine in Kawachi, and at the Kashima shrine in Hitachi.

28. Yanagita Kunio, Teihon Yanagita Kunio-shū. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1973. Vol. II, "Ujigami to ujiko," pp. 413-424.

29. Hori Ichirō, Folk Religion in Japan: Continuity and Change. Eds., Joseph M. Kitagawa and Alan L. Miller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. 38.

30. The deities of the Aki and Saeki families became gods of navigation. The god Inari, although associated with agriculture from the beginning, was originally the ujigami of the Hata, a powerful immigrant family, as well as the tutelary deity of the Yamashiro area. After it became associated with the Buddhist Shingon sect in the ninth century its ties with the Hata and the local community grew weaker. Inari finally became a popular god of fertility.

31. Hisaki Yukio, Nihon no shūkyō: kako to genzai. Tokyo: Saimaru Shuppankai, 1971, pp. 78-83.

32. Chiba Masaji, Matsuri no hōshakaigaku. Tokyot Kōbundō, 1970, p. 79.

33. Sects can be regarded as groups which take shape in response to a founder and his message (e.g. True Pure Land Buddhism)t. Cultic orders, on the other hand, are organized

around pre-existing holy places by religious entrepreneurs of various sorts. James H. Foard in his doctoral dissertation, Ippen Shōnin and Popular Buddhism in Kamakura Japan (June 1977; Stanford University, unpublished) shows that the failure to make this distinction has resulted in a basic misunderstanding and depreciation of the mission of wayfaring folk-priests like Ippen. The confraternities discussed in this paper are primarily organizations of the sects.

34. Harada Toshiaki, Shūkyō to shakai. Tokyo: Tōkai Daigaku Shuppankai, 1974, pp. 229-231.

35. Takatori Masao and Hashimoto Mineo, Shūkyō izen. Tokyo: (NHK Bukkusu), Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 1971, pp. 129-130.

36. This chart is a summary and modification of Hori, Folk Religion..., pp. 32-81.

37. During the Heian period thete of the Nara court became known as kōe or simply as kō.

38. Sakurai Tokutarō, Nihon minkan shinkōron. Tokyot Kōbundō, 1970, pp. 193-196.

39. Sakurai Tokutarō, Kō shūdan seiritsu katei no kenkyū. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1962, pp. 554-579.

40. Hori, Folk Religion..., p. 36.

41. Waida Manabu, "Symbolism of 'Descentt in Tibetan Sacred Kingship and some East Asian Parallels," Numen, Vol. XX, Fasc. 1 (April 1973), pp. 60-78.

42. Hori, Folk Religion..., p. 69.

43. See above, pp. 19-20.

44. Sakurai, Nihon minkan..., p. 196.

45. Robert N. Bellah, Tokugawa Religion: The Values of Pre-Industrial Japan. Boston: Beacon, 1957, pp. 107-177.

46. After their abolition by Oda Nobunaga, guilds were tolerated again only after the seclusion edicts were proclaimed and domestic trade began to flourish in the seventeenth century. By the middle of the nineteenth century the guilds had gained nearly complete control over wide areas of the economy, fixing prices at exorbitant levels, and preventing new businesses and shops from opening. In response to the hue and cry raised against these abuses, in 1841-1842 the government once again abolished these in-

stitutions. After a brief revival, they finally succumbed to the open competition of the Meiji period. Thus the commercial and economic za had a fate similar to the socio-religious monopolies we discussed above. Neither was able to survive in the Modern period.

47. Smith, The Agrarian Origins..., p. 148.

48. Kasahara Kazuo, Chūsei ni okeru Shinshū kyōdan no keisei. Tokyon Shinjinbutsu Oraisha, 1971, pp. 20-37.

49. Hagiwara, Chūsei saishi..., p. 169.

50. Toyoda Takeshi, "Chūsei ni okeru jinja no saishi soshiki ni tsuite," Shigaku zasshi (1942), Vol. 53, No. 11, p. 1375. For a general description of the so orngo see Fukudan Eijiro, "Sōson no hatten," Nihon rekishi koza. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1957, III, pp. 69-75, and Hagiwara, Chusei saishi..., Ch. 4, "Sōson no hatten to saishi soshiki," pp. 167-277 and Ch. 7, "Gōson saishi soshiki no kansei," pp. 413-454.

51. Smith, The Agrarian Origins..., p. 188.

52. Such subdivisions of the miyaza were one way of adjusting to the clamor of the up-and-coming classes to be admitted to the guilds. For this history of the guild in Imabori-gō see Nakamura Ken, "Ōmi no kuni Tokuchin-ho Imabori-gō no 'sō' oboegaki," Shakai kagaku (Dōshisha Daigaku Jinbunka-gaku Kenkyujo), January 1970, 11, Vol. III, No. 4, pp. 110-160 and "Ōmi no kuni Tokuchin-ho Imabori-go kenkyu no seika to kadai," Shakai kagaku (March 1976), 20, Vol. VI, No. 2, pp. 88-210.

53. Murata Sōkichi, Hiyoshi jinja shiki, 1970 (unpublished). When I visited this village in 1976, I found that while the privileges of the miyaza had been greatly restricted, the affairs of the parish are still in the hands of an Upper Guild of eight men (holding office for eight years), a Lower Guild of about fifty household heads, a lay-priest (kannushi) and an oblationer (shoshi). Modern scholarship has shown that the much venerated "charter" granted to Botaro was actually a fake drawn up by merchants in the area to legitimate their own monopolistic schemes. This charter-amulet is an excellent example of the reflection of micropolitics and microeconomics in the religious symbols of the communitys festival faith.

54. For the influence of this crop on the Kinai see William B. Hauser, "The Diffusion of Cotton Processing and Trade in the Kinai Region in Tokugawa Japan," Journal of Asian Studies, XXXIII, No. 4 (August 1974), pp. 633-649.

55. This chart is a translation of one prepared by Takeda Choshu, "Kinsei sonraku no miyaza to ko," Nihon shukyoshi koza, Vol. III, Shukyo to minshu seikatsu, ed. Tenaga Saburo, et al. Tokyot Santtichi Shobo, p. 176. The original data were assembled by Imai Rintaro and Yagi Akihiro, Hoken shakai no noson kozo. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1955, pp. 207-233.

56. Among these 24 families were 5 genin iemochi families who were actually being treated as yakunin by this time.

57. Ando Seiichi, Kinsei miyaza no shiteki kenkyu. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1960, pp. 105-106.

58. The word ujiko ("children of the clan") seems to indicate subordination to the ujibito and can therefore be compared with such words as yamago, tago, funago, nago, etc. (Wakamori, Chusei kyodotai..., p. 100.) While some early documents use the word ujiko to refer to the woman of the clan, by the mid-fifteenth century it was being used for both sexes. (Hagiwara, Chusei saishi..., pp. 320-321.)

59. Toyoda, "Chusei ni okeru jinja...," p. 1354.

60. Hagiwara, Chusei saishi..., pp. 314-333, 427-431.

61. Yanagita, "Ujigami...," p. 403; Higo Kazuo, "Ujiko soshiki," Minzokugaku kenkyu (1946), N.s., Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 23-40; Ariga Kizaemon, "Senzo to ujigami,t' Minzokugaku kenkyu (December 1967), Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 175-184.

62. Naoe Hiroji, "A Study of Yashiki-gami, the Deity of House and Grounds,t' in Richard M. Dorson, ed., Studies in Japanese Folklore. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963, pp. 198-214.

63. Yanagita Kunio divided the ujigami into three types. In order of their historical development they are: 1) the deity of the ancient linked households (ichimon-ujigama), 2) that of the later household and its property (yashiki-ujigami), and 3) that of the village (mura-ujigami). Although the ujigami that one thinks of today is primarily the tutelary deity of villages (i.e. a territorial god), the fact that today in some areas the ujigami is called the uchigami (or household deity) shows that the cults of family and village have not always been as distinct as one might imagine. Further evidence for this comes from the Kanto Plain, Ibaraki, Chiba, Tochigi, Tohoku and Kyushu--places distant from the old capital--where household deities were often called ujigami, ubusuna-sama, or chinju-gami, terms generally associated with territorial, and not family, gods. Yanagita points out that household deities

were often amalgamated as community gods. This metamorphosis was not unnatural since the cults of lineage deities in ancient Japan were probably quite similar to one another. The places where they were worshiped were close together so that one clan would know how similar its rites were to those of its neighbors. Furthermore, there were few shrine buildings in those days to impede such mergers. Mergers might also have been a way of sharing the pleasures, the expenses, and the inconveniences of the abstinences and taboos which were part of the worship of the kami. Finally, Yanagita speculates, these mergers were made possible by a change in the concept of deity. Villagers simply forgot that their gods had once been their ancestors. This lapsus memoriae weakened the particularistic bonds between family and god and allowed the deity to be merged with those of other kinship groups as a new community deity, or ujigami. Yanagita, "Ujigami..n," ppn 405-407.) Hori Ichiro, who criticized his father-in-lawns theory of the lapsus memoriae, stressed not the integration of family cults in the formation of the ujigami faith, but the process leading "from the undifferentiated, vague concept of spirits to the gradual articulation and clarification of such deification...." As a result of migrations, invasions and missionary activities, deities bearing the name of specific family groups became widespread. "Thus, the original vague, local, spiritual concept (of deity) became differentiated and individualized.n' Folk Religion..., p. 58.

64. Takeda Chōshū, "Kinsei shakai to bukkyō," Asao Naohiro, et al. eds., Nihon rekishi, Vol. 9, Kinsei 1. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1975, pp. 264-302n See also the same author's Sosen sūhai. Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1972, pp. 173-185.

65. Yoshimuro Keijō, ed., Nihon bukkyōshi. Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1969, Vol. III (Kinsei-Kindaihen), pp. 220-224.

66. According to a survey conducted in 1932, about 85% of Japan's outcast population, the eta or mikaihō burakumin are members of the Pure Land sect. In one part of Okayama Prefecture there were some Shingon and Nichiren burakumin; in Shizuoka and to the east there were also some who had joined the Nichiren, Rinzai, Sōtō, Ji, and Shingi Shingon sects. The Pure Land sects offered these pariahs cargo-cult visions of paradise commonly found among the religions of the oppressed. Since many of their priests were already married (kebōzu), it was only natural for them to be affiliated with a sect with married clergy. The government also pressured the burakumin to join the sect. (Yoshimuro, ed., Nihon bukkyōshi, Vol. III, pp. 216-217.)

In spite of the popular following enjoyed by Hōnen, Shinran, and other Pure Land leaders, the movement also appealed to

the upper classesa The Chinzei branch founded by Shōkōbō Bencho was patronized by warriors and landlords. Likewise, the Seizan branch founded by Zennebō Shōkū was supported by the aristocracya During its period of greatest popularity in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Ippen's Ji sect lost many of its peasant believers because of its conservative stand in the rural uprisings of that period. While peasants were deserting the sect for the more congenial atmosphere of the Ikkō (Pure Land) sect, the Ji sect was further weakened by the defection of many warrior families to Zen temples.

The class influence upon the Zen sects is also of interest. While the warriors were clearly the pillars of Zen during the Ashikaga and Tokugawa periods, the sect's appeal became quite general as can be judged by the appearance of such figures as Ikkyū Sōjun (1394-1481), Bankei (1622-1692) and Hakuin (1685-1768)a Sōtō Zen, especially after it was refashioned by Keizan Jōkin (1268-1325), had a clear appeal for the massesa Rinzai, however, was associated with the official Gozan Temples and failed to enlist the support of the common people. In general, the more these sects permitted "mixed practices," the greater was their popular appeala The more they insisted on a "single practice"a- and the more they were influenced by China and Chinese monks--the more limited was their following among the masses.

67. Suzuki Eitarō, in Suzuki Eitarō chosakushū (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1968, Vola I, Nihon noson shakaigaku genri, Part I, pp. 335-340), points out that it is a rare community where ujiko and danka completely overlapa

68. Yanagita, "Ujigami...," p. 439.

69. Andō Seiichi, "Waga kokyō no kako to shōrai," Kumano bunka (Nachi Taisha: Kumano Bunka Kenkyūkai), August 1975, No. 1, pp. 18-19.

70. Yanagita, "Ujigami...," p. 430.

71a Sight-seeing groups in modern Japan have nearly the same social and economic structure as the pre-modern confraternity. Sakurai, Kō shūdan..., pp. 4-6a

72. Sakurai, Nihon minkan..., p. 199.

73. Ibid., pp. 168-172.

74. See footnote 81 below for another example of the involvement of such kō in village politics.

75. Kasahara Kazuo, Chūsei ni okeru..., passim.

76. This seems to be a striking contrast to sects and confraternities in the Christian West where one usually associates faith with voluntarism, at least in the first generation of a movement. For this reason it would be hazardous to think of even the Pure Land kō as embodying the same kind of voluntarism (i.e. individually determined commitments) we find in, say, the early Free Churches of the Protestant Reformation. On the other hand, the differences between the two situations is not as great as one might imagine, especially when contemporary religious institutions are compared. In the case of the modern denomination, the spiritual heirs of the Free Churches, affiliations are clearly based on heredity and are influenced, to some extent, by social class and status. One must therefore be careful not to compare the ideal of voluntary religious commitments in the (Protestant) West with the fact of inherited affiliations in Japan. This is especially important since religious commitment has become a major paradigm for rational, purposeful--and "modern"--activity in the Weberian school. See below, p. 68 ff.

77. Ikeda Yoshisuke, "Kō shūdan no shakaiteki seikaku," Tetsugaku kenkyu (Kyoto Daigaku), October 1957, Vol. XXXIX, No. 7, pp. 15-35.

78. Suzuki Eitarō, Suzuki..., pp. 347-349.

79. Takeda Chōshū, "Kinsei sonraku no miyaza to kō," p. 144.

80. Sakurai, Kō shūdan..., p. 7.

81. The history of the Izu Shrine in Katada (Ōmi), not far from Imabori-gō, is a good example of the involvement of the miyaza and kō in the micropolitics of the semi-autonomous villages (gō) of this area. In the fourteenth century a clique of wealthy provincial families (dogō) had wrested control of the village and its economy--especially transport--from the shoen officials and had assumed the leadership of the local parish guild called the tonobarashū. Opposed to this guild was the mataudo class made up of lower-class myoshu. While the mataudo (who themselves were the overlords of several subordinate classes) were not allowed to participate in the activities of the guild, they were far from being disorganized. After converting to Pure Land Buddhism, they formed a nembutsu-kon. This gave them a stronger social bond, one which contrasted vividly with the dōzoku-based tonobarashū. As the economy and society of the go continued to develop, the kinship ties of the dogō class were weakened. Around 1400 the tonobarashū was drawn into a confraternity affiliated with Daitokuji. This added to their arsenal a more potent, non-fictive ideological weapon for the control of the area. Class distinctions now

had clear Buddhist labels: the Zenists (the village Establishment) versus the Amidists (subordinate classes and client families)a Gradually, however, the fortunes of the mataudo began to improve so that in terms of wealth and power they became virtually indistinguishable from their rivals. Later on, provincial samurai families (gōshi) gained control of the local economy and filled the offices of the parish guild in order to protect their interestsa The complex history of the guild and confraternities of Katada came to an end only in the Meiji period with thea fall of these samurai families. See Mori Ryūkichi, "Miyaza no shōchō o meguru kankyu to jōken," Nihonshi kenkyū (October 1954), XXII, pp. 10-21.

82. Iwamoto Tokuichi, "Shinto Ceremonies Connected with the Entry of Foreigners,a Proceedings of the IXth International Congress for the History of Religions (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1960), pp. 315-319.

83. Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974, p. 7.

84. Morioka, Religion..., pp. 155-167.

85. Chiba, Matsuri..a, p. 81.

86. Yanagita, "Ujigami...," p. 398.

87. Morioka, Religion..., pp. 39-72. For an account of similar pressures on the miyaza itself in the Modern Period see Winston Davis, "The Miyaza and the Fisherman: Ritual Status in Coastal Villages of Wakayama Prefecture," Asian Folklore Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 1-29, 1977.

88. Ikado Fujio, Kamigoroshi no jidai. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1973, p. 182.

89. Sakurai, Nihon minkan..., p. 197a Rennyo has made the same complaint in the fifteenth century.

90. Suzuki Eitarō, Suzuki..., pp. 340-349.

91. Sumiya Mikio, "Kokuminteki bijon no tōgō to bunkai," in Itō Sei, et al. eds.a Kindei Nihon shisōshi kōza. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1972, Vol. V, pp. 37-39.

92. Kitagawa, Religion in Japanese History, p. 267.

93. Cf. Daniel C. Holtom, The National Faith of Japan. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1938, and Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943.

94. Tsurumi Shunsuke, Nichijōteki shisō no kanōsei. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1967, pp. 34-38.

95. See R. P. Dore, City Life in Japan: A Study of a Tokyo Ward. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958, p. 322 and 324.

96. Murayama Tomoyoshi, "Byakuya in Murayama Tomoyoshi-shū, Gendai Nihon Bungaku Zenshu. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1957, pp. 345-347, cited in Tsurumi Kazuko, Social Change and the Individual: Japan Before and After Defeat in World War II. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 59.

97. Maruyama Masao, Nihon no shisō. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1970, p. 46.

98. Irokawa Daikichi, "Japan's Grass-Roots Tradition: Current Issues in the Mirror of History," Japan Quarterly, Vol. XX, No. 1 (January-March 1973), p. 83. See also the same author's Meiji no bunka. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1970, Chapter VIII, Pt. 4, "Maruyama 'kokutai'-ron no kentō," pp. 287-301.

99. The solar calendar, and the sense of time that went with it, were the concerns of the bureaucrat, the school master and the industrialist. By law, calendars had to be printed with the dates of the Gregorian system in large figures, with small letters marking the dates of the lunar calendar. Farmers, however, consistently followed the small figures. These small numbers also stood for a "qualitative" sense of time, since some days were lucky, others unlucky. The introduction of the Gregorian calendar and the new series of national festivals (based on the rituals of the imperial household and its solar ancestors) were all part of what broadly may be characterized as an only partially successful attempt to nationalize and "solarize" the lunar community of the folk.

100. See below, pp. 67-73.

101. R. P. Dore and Ōuchi Tsutomu, "Rural Origins of Japanese Fascism," in James W. Morley, ed., Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 198.

102. Chiba, Matsuri..., pp. 303-308.

103. Murakami Shigeyoshi, Nihon hyakunen no shūkyō. Tokyo: Kōdnsha, 1968, p. 22.

104. Ikado Fujio, "Trend and Problems in New Religions: Religion in Urban Society," in Morioka Kiyomi and William H. Newell, eds., The Sociology of Japanese Religion. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968, pp. 103-106.

105. Ibid., p. 110.

106. For a development of the "supermarket model" of religious recruiting see Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, "Secularization and Pluralism," International Yearbook for the Sociology of Religion (1966), Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 73-84a The average member of these religions often knows surprisingly little about other New Religions, or about the historical ties between his own group and the others. Which one he finally joins is due largely to happenstance and to the influence of advertisements, family and friends. See Goto Yobun, "S kyodan Morioka dojo sobyo a nyushin no shuhen o chushin ni," Shukyogaku nenpo (1975), No. 20 (Taisho Daigaku Shukyo Gakkai), pp. 35-43.

107. Chiba, Matsuri..., p. 84.

108. Wakamori, Chusei..., p. 147.

109. Between 1960 and 1974 alone the members per household in Japan dropped from 4.54 to 3.44. In the same period, in spite of a total increase in the population, households with 10 or more members (to take the extreme case) declined from 365,689 to 33,300. Those with 7 members decreased from 1,663,302 to 874,000. Japan Statistical Yearbook (Japan Statistical Association). Tokyo: Mainichi Newspapers, 1976, pp. 28-29.

110. Japan Times, December 5, 1976, p. 14.

111. While its history can be traced back hundreds of years, this temple has been a pokkuri-dera since the middle of the Tokugawa period. At that time it was patronized by people in the entertainment world. It is said that in those days the sidewalks of the temple never had to be swept because the skirts of courtesans, geisha and other fair ladies going to and from the temple kept them perpetually clean. These clients of the temple seem to have had two things in common with the elderly clients who come to Kichidenji today: 1) they were cut off from normal family ties and therefore hoped for a quick end to life when they grew old and could no longer care for themselves, and 2) they were, for different reasons, afraid of the "diseases of the lower parts." From the beginning, the temple had no sectarian identity, though it was forced into the Pure Land sect by the Tokugawa government. It still has no danka and performs no funerals.

112a Naganuma Iwane, "Pokkuri-dera o yogiru oi to shi," Asahi Janaru (December 19, 1975), Vol. 17, No. 54, pp. 86-91.

113. What is more, not all scholars would agree on the importance to be assigned to each of these disjunctions in the making of the modern West. For example, the emphasis on religious transcendence in the writings of Weber, Parsons and Bellah is often completely overlooked or disregarded by other students of modernization. Robert Bellah's various essays on Japan have stressed the countryés "submerged tradition of transcendence" as a reason for her failure to develop wholesome, democratic institutions. See Beyond Belief, p. 118. For this reason, and because of the particularism of her value-system, Bellah finds much in common between the fundamental social structures of Japan and pre-modern societies. "The type of fusion of culture, society and personality which seems to be present in Japan is a normal feature of primitive and archaic cultures. It was found quite generally in the bronze age monarchies which existed throughout the civilized world until the first millenium B.C. At that time, however, a series of social and cultural revolutions broke up the archaic fusion and ushered in ae new type of society which I have called elsewhere the historic type.é' "Japanés Cultural Identitye Some Reflections on the Work of Watsuji Tetsuro,é' Journal of Asian Studies, XXIV, No. 4 (August 1965), p. 592. Although some have taken this statement to imply that Japan is still in a moral Bronze Age, clearly this is not what was intended. What Professor Bellah, in effect, is suggesting is that, with the exception of a few intellectual and spiritual geniuses, the Japanese have not experienced the kind of cultural cleavages described by Jaspers and others as "axial breakthroughs." See page 8 above. Only in a few cases has Japan attained the critical reflexivity which enabled men in other civilizations to transcend the givenness of their own social and cultural assumptions. One senses that for Bellah, the danger of Japan's cultural heritage lies not in a Bronze Age relapse, but in the social and political consequences entailed by the failure to develop and sustain a dialectical imagination. In short, he is concerned here, as he is in his studies of American culture, with the nemesis of self-idolization.

114. Edward Norbeck, Religion and Society in Modern Japane Continuity and Change. Houstone Tourmaline, 1970, p. 129.

115. Berger and Luckmann, "Secularization and Pluralism," p. 73.

116. Kamishima Jirō, Kindai Nihon no seishin kōzō. Tokyoe Iwanami Shoten, 1971, pp. 40-89.

117. Social Change and the Individual..., p. 211.

118. Talcott Parsons, "Belief, Unbelief, and Disbelief,é' in Rocco Caporale and Antonio Grumellie eds., The Culture of

Unbelief. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p. 238.

119. The Politics of Modernization. Chicago and Londona University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. 10. As we have learned from Jaspers (page 8 above), "debate" has been a characteristic of self-critical, "pluralistic" societies since the first millenium B.C.

120. Earl Miner, An Introduction to Japanese Court Poetry. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968, p. 9.

121. Norbeck, Religion and Society..., p. 138.

122. Nakamura Hajime, Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India, China, Tibet, Japan. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966, p. 544.

123. Ikado Fujio et al., Nihonjin no shūkyō. Kyoto: Tankōsha, 1970, p. 99. More important than the ontological dichotomy between the sacred and the profane is the ritual distinction between the ceremonial, public, extraordinary and bright (hare) on the one hand, and the informal, private, common and dark (ke) on the other. Hare marks out the time and space of festivals. Ke indicates what H. G. Wells once called "everydayishness." This distinction extends to the smallest items of food, dress and behavior. Like other structural polarities in Japanese culture (such as work-play, in-out, public-private, life-death) the distinction between hare and ke grows out of a "logic of relative contrasts." Itō Mikiharu, "Nihon bunka no kōzōteki rikai o mezashite," Kikan jinruigaku (1973), Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 3-30. Hare-ke is therefore quite different from the dichotomy between the sacred and the profane which Emile Durkheim defined in terms of an absolute opposition. See Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. New York: Free Press, 1965, p. 53.

124. In the survey of Sekai Mahikari Bunmei Kyōdan cited above, 26.5% of the respondents had previously been members of a different New Religion.

125. See above, p. 60.

126. For an example of the conservative values enshrined by the New Religions see Winston Davis, "Ittōena The Myths and Rituals of Liminality," History of Religions, Parts I-III (May 1975), Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 282-321, Parts IV-VI (August 1975), Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 1-33 (especially pp. 27-33).

127. See page 8 above.

128. Winston Davis, "The Civil Religion of Inoue Tetsujirō," Japanese Journal of Religious Studies (March 1976), Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 15.

129. Robert N. Bellah, Beyond Belief..., p. 70.

130. Rocco Grumelli, "Secularization: Between Belief and Unbelief," in Caporale and Grumelli, eds., The Culture of Unbelief, p. 89.